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THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

ROGER PEARSON
General Editor

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CONTENTS

Security, Space and Cost
A New Affordable Defense Proposal
By Robert C. Richardson III 3

Prevention of Cancer and Coronary Heart Disease and the Reduction in the Cost of the National Health Service
By H. J. Eysenck and R. Grossarth-Maticek 25

North Korea: Institutional and Economic Obstacles to Dynamic Succession
By David B. Kanin. 49

Decentralizing Public Services in Developing Countries: Issues and Opportunities
By Dennis A. Rondinelli 77

Is the 'All Politics is Local' Myth True? The 1982 House Races as a Case Study
By Edward W. Chester. 99

Communist and Far Left Organizations in Contemporary America
By Joel Sikorski 117

Book Reviews 126

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SECURITY, SPACE, AND COST
A New, Affordable, Defense Proposal

Robert C. Richardson III, Brig. Gen. (USAF Ret.)
Deputy Director, High Frontier Inc.

The new U.S. Congress and Administration inherited three major problems that are interrelated: How to perpetuate a credible U.S. and NATO security posture in the present environment; How to best assure access to, and exploit space for the benefit of the US and the Free World, and; how to cope with the deficit.

While there are many other major problems, these are the most challenging and critical ones. The ability to handle the deficit depends to a great extent on the solutions adopted for space and defense. The ability to defend and the use of space are increasingly interdependent. Further, that which must be done in both space and defense depends not only on decisions we might make but also on Soviet decisions and actions. The nature of the Soviet threat and threats from other quarters largely determine the requirements and timetables for US defense and space programs.

The Soviet military buildup throughout the 1970's and early 1980's has shifted the strategic nuclear balance in their direction. The resulting loss of US strategic superiority eroded the credibility of the US deterrent by increasing the likelihood that the Soviet's could destroy most of our retaliatory missile forces before they could be used.

The current strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) provides deterrence based on the simple principle of revenge." I can't stop you from hitting me, but if you do I can and will destroy your house, wife, and children". Obviously deterrence based on revenge requires a perceived

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ability to inflict the promised level of revenge and a willingness to do so whether or not the act of vengeance makes logical sense. If we now apply these simple truths to the present situation we find that the Soviet buildup in numbers and especially quality of nuclear strike weapons is increasingly jeopardizing the survival of the quantity of US retaliatory forces needed to keep the MAD promise credible.

As a result of the new security environment that was already emerging by the late 1970's and referred to by the Carter Administration as the window of vulnerability efforts were made to protect our increasingly vulnerable retaliatory forces. In the case of ICBM's — our principal retaliatory weapons — these measures fell into two broad categories: (1) Passive measures designed to protect the missiles if hit (shelters or hard silos) or else to make them hard to find (concealment and mobility), and (2) active measures designed to destroy the Soviet missiles on the way to their targets.

In deference to the existing strategy of MAD, and to the associated ABM Treaty written to perpetuate this concept of deterrence by preventing the building of "shields" by either side, the initial US response to the growing Soviet first strike threat was to search for cost effective passive protection for missiles. This led to proposals such as MX Racetrack, a mobile shelter scheme that exploited the shell game concept; Dense Pack, an idea that called for shifting missiles among silos in close proximity; and most recently road or rail mobile systems such as Midgetman and MX Rail Mobile that would make Soviet targeting difficult.

Unfortunately, all the passive measures proposed so far suffer from two critical shortcomings. First, they are very expensive and politically objectionable. Second, they are not likely to remain effective for any length of time.

The shelter scheme, designed to protect 200 MX missiles, had a 70 billion dollar price tag. The Dense Pack Scheme, to protect 100 missiles, had a 40 billion dollar price tag. Building a new, small, road mobile missile system (Midgetmen) would cost upwards of 35 billion for 200

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missiles and 100 MX rail mobile missiles would cost upwards of 15 billion. In addition moving nuclear weapons around in populated US areas, or tearing up vast sections of the wilderness for shelters, are not acceptable solutions to the people. But, from a cost effectiveness point of view, even if money and public attitudes were of no consideration, all these passive solutions can and will be rendered useless by improvements in Soviet intelligence, space detection, and offensive forces and weapons.

Recognizing the cost, shortcomings, and unacceptability of the passive measure solutions to missile survivability, In March of 1983 President Reagan proposed the development of active defenses to perpetuate deterrence in the face of growing Soviet strategic nuclear superiority. This was his Strategic Defense Initiative Program (SDI) later dubbed "Star Wars" by its critics.

By 1983 technology had progressed to the point where it was clear that effective defenses against ballistic missiles could be built. The deterrent such defenses would provide by virtue of their ability to defend against attacks rather than merely revenge them, would not only be more acceptable morally but would also be more durable, being largely independent of any further Soviet offensive force buildups or improvements. A credible deterrent based upon active defenses (SDI) is not dependent upon offensive superiority or even equivalence as is one based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Instead, it is dependent only on its likely and perceived effectiveness, a factor we control and not the Soviets. Aggressors that cannot figure out how to attain their goals by military means are deterred from trying. You don't start a fight you know you can't win or even doubt you can win. It's that simple.

Since 1983 the debate has raged between those who support the Reagan proposal and those who oppose it. Supporters of the SDI approach have always considered the MAD strategy a moral aberration that worked only because the US enjoyed decisive nuclear superiority. Killing in

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retribution is questionable even in civilized warfare. The role of military establishments is to defend their country and people — NOT to avenge their deaths. But whatever the faults or merits of the MAD strategy, the shifting balance has made it obsolete as a credible deterrent strategy and proposals to perpetuate it with passive protection schemes have proven to be both too costly and short lived solutions.

But those bent on perpetuating MAD seem to believe that a rational military strategy could lead to a new arms race or even to nuclear war. They rationalize that if allowed to pursue defenses, nations might succeed and feel secure enough to start a war. They strangely conclude that total vulnerability to attack deters attack rather than invites it.

Opponents also seem to think that somehow any change in the MAD basis for deterrence places arms control agreements in jeopardy and that, without the ABM Treaty, the Soviets will never agree to arms reductions. This last concern, however, seems to be based solely on Soviet statements obviously motivated by a desire to keep the ABM Treaty which now protects their advantages gained by offensive force buildup. It also buys the Soviets time to expand their own anti missile defenses, and protects them from a technological competition in space born defensive systems which they know they can't win.

Today there is general acceptance of the growing threat to US retaliatory capabilities and hence of the need to protect them. On the other hand, this problem has not been adequately associated with the basic concept of strategic defenses. SDI has been largely viewed as a means of defending the public as a whole, and arguments for or against it have centered on whether less than 100% effectiveness in this regard was worthwhile. Meanwhile our protecting US retaliatory forces has ignored SDI and focused primarily on choosing between passive measures such as rail mobile MX or road mobile Midgetman.

It is said that every cloud has a silver lining. The Senator Tower confirmation debate, whatever its negative

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aspects were, created the opportunity to get SDI considered by the Bush Administration as a valid alternative to passive mobility measures to protect retaliatory missiles and provide deterrence to nuclear attack. Senator Tower was quoted as saying he did not think SDI could ever provide a total defense for the American people, High Frontier and its allies seized the opportunity to point out that it never was intended to be and that the real purpose of SDI was to perpetuate deterrence more effectively, lastingly, and at less cost than the mobile missile systems under consideration.

This short historical summary brings us to the present. In 1989 there remains a Soviet military threat regardless of Glastroika. In fact the Glastroika trends in the Soviet Union are likely to create a period of instability even greater than that which existed during the cold war. If they result in the hoped for evolution of communism away from efforts at world domination the transition cannot but be "rocky". Internal resistance to such change is bound to be massive with the likelihood of revolts and conflicts into which the West could be dragged. If Gorbachev should be overthrown, a return to aggressive military dictatorship willing, to use external nuclear aggression to quiet internal dissension, is not inconceivable.

Whatever happens in terms of the scope and nature of the Soviet threat during the next decade, the Free World is bound to be faced with a highly unstable situation. We must maintain a credible deterrent to nuclear attack until circumstances in the USSR have eliminated any possibility of a first strike by nuclear missiles. We must make sure that the march of humanity into space does not occur under hostile foreign leadership able to exploit this new high ground to our detriment. And, we must do these things without spending America into bankruptcy at a time when we are already saddled with a massive debt, and facing great social problems-drugs, the homeless, etc. This situation brings to mind a famous observation made by Sir John Slessor, a well known British Air Chief Marshall in WW II, who said, when

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England was faced with a similar budget situation:

> "It is customary in democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free."[1]

If America is to keep its people "alive and free" on into the next century we must, in the near term, solve our retaliatory force survival problem in order to maintain an effective, credible, deterrence of a first strike for at least a decade or two. While doing this we should also face the problem of growing Soviet control of space. This means preventing the Soviets (or any other power) from acquiring the ability to exercise control over our access to or use of near space. This means investing enough in US space developments, programs and other activities to ensure that the Free World will have ready access to all worthwhile economic, social, resource and other benefits likely to be obtainable by those able and willing to pursue them beyond the High Frontier. And, in addition we have to do all this without going broke, i.e. while solving the near-term deficit problem.

The High Frontier Solution.

Given the nature of the problem how can we solve it?

We have basically three variables to play with. (1) Our resources — the men,weapons, and money; (2) Our commitments — the tasks we have to do or be ready to do to ensure our security, and; (3) Our strategy — the method we adopt to do these tasks. This equation has to be balanced against any given threat. If, as is now the case, we have to cut costs i.e., reduce resources expended on security — then the logical way to go about it is to cut down on the number of tasks or else find less expensive ways of doing the ones to which we must remain committed.

In the present situation we know that we have to solve

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the cost problem. We also know we have to reverse the weakening trend in our deterrent capability resulting from the increasing vulnerability of our retaliatory missile forces. And, in the process of addressing these two requirements we must take into account the growing threat of accidental or third country missile launches as well as the critical looming threat to the Free World's access to space.

These four basic requirements obviously limit the ways we can go about making economies. Reducing the scope of the security job such as turning over the defense of the Pacific to the Japanese won't help to solve the missile or space threats. The same applies to cutting back on existing forces or weapons. Only a change in the methods of going about doing the defense business can hope to deal simultaneously with all problem areas while saving money. Recognizing this, High Frontier examined strategies now used in the key areas of concern and found solutions based on exploiting America's long suit – advanced technologies.

First, we found that by changing how we go about maintaining an effective deterrent, and how we now ensure the survivability of our offensive missiles, we could save the taxpayers upwards of 150 billion dollars over the next ten years. Next, we determined that were we to merely change the current method of moving people and cargo from earth to space by switching from vehicles derived from munitions to vehicles derived from transportation systems, additional billions could be saved in all activities requiring the use of space, both civil and military.

The Deterrent Element

In 1981 and 1982 High Frontier foresaw the weakening of the strategic deterrent and evaluated the feasibility, desirability and political acceptability of introducing missile defenses and changing the strategy in the process. This High Frontier study also looked at the space aspects of the problem and recommended, in its February 1982 Report, that the US should make a major effort to lead the free world into the

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development and exploitation of space. What happened with SDI, partly as a result of this effort and partly due to the concurrent recognition by others that something of this nature would eventually have to be done, is now history. Suffice it to say that the defense recommendations took off with the Reagan 1983 SDI decision but the space initiative "train" was derailed by the Challenger accident.

In January 1989 the Bush Administration took over from the Reagan Administration. In the process they inherited the deterrent strengthening problem, the deficit problem, and the space mess. While SDI seems to have acquired a life of its own, even though inadequate to as yet provide a solution to deterrence, the deficit has acquired new significance and the US space effort is floundering like a ship without a rudder. Any logical, affordable, and near term solution to these critical problem areas can only be dealt with as a "package". The money problem, if not the security problem, calls for an integrated approach.

With the advent of the new administration, High Frontier and its expert friends, associates and advisors looked at all these problems and arrived at a proposed approach that appears to be technologically feasible, affordable, politically acceptable and sound security-wise. This solution, if pursued, opens up the opportunity to solve the deterrent problem, open up space for far greater government and free enterprise exploitation, and do this for less overall cost than any of the separate solutions currently being considered in these areas. It is a package proposal and therefore should be evaluated as such and not piecemeal.

In broad, simple terms, the High Frontier concept is to solve the deterrent problem as originally proposed by President Reagan and the 1982 High Frontier report but with the space based Brilliant Pebbles approach developed by Livermore Laboratories and most recently proposed in General Abrahamson's final report to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. While doing this we would also build and test a new space transportation system that could

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reduce the cost of transporting cargos, pigs, and people to and from space to less than 50 dollars per pound. This would be a cost reduction to be compared with the $8000/lb on today's Shuttles and over $4000/lb on today's best expendable launch vehicles (ELV's), eg: Atlas, Delta Titan-D34, etc.

The SDI Office in the Pentagon has evaluated the Brilliant Pebbles system and found that it is feasible and far cheaper than any other approaches to establishing an effective space defense layer. General Abrahamson in a final summation of the 5 year, 16 billion dollar SDI research effort which he managed until recently, stated that:

> "..the future cost of research, development and deployment of this Brilliant Pebbles concept should be well within 10 Billion. A separate surveillance satellite system ... should not exceed approximately 11 Billion. The Command and control ground complex ... should not exceed 4 billions. Thus and entire SDI Phase I system...should not cost more than 25 Billion."[2]

In simple terms what the combination of a need to do something about perpetuating deterrence in light of the shift in the strategic nuclear balance plus the results of over 5 years of research on SDI add up to is that SDI is not only the best, and most durable, way of coping with the US security problem but also it is by far the most economical. Published figures on all alternatives indicate that approximately 150 billion dollars can be saved over the next ten years. (See Tables A and B)

In addition, adopting the Brilliant Pebbles architecture to intercept missiles from space will not only meet the urgent requirement to reinforce deterrence against a Soviet First Strike but will also provide many other advantages as indicated on the chart – such as protection against accidental launches and rogue missiles.

The Defense Department's 25 Billion dollar figure for a first phase SDI deployment is, as displayed on the chart, a major reduction in what the taxpayers will pay for security

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A Cost - Saving Case for SDI
(Costs Over 10 Years in Billions)

PROGRAMS	OFFENSE-ONLY PACKAGE	OFFENSE/DEFENSE PACKAGE
Land Based Missiles, Including New Mobiles, MX in Silos, Other Missiles in Silos	60 Billion[1]	10 Billion[2]
Sea - Based Missiles, Including Trident/D5, Older Submarines	130 Billion[3]	50 Billion[4]
Bombers, Including 50 - 100 B-2's Additional B-1's, Older B-52's	80 Billion[5]	30 Billion[6]
SDI, Research Only	40 Billion[7]	0[8]
SDI, Phase I Deployment	0[9]	70 Billion[10]
SDI, Phase II Development	0[9]	20 Billion[11]
Hardened C^3 I	20 Billion[12]	5 Billion[13]
Total	330 Billion	185 Billion

TABLE A

Courtesy of High Frontier Inc.

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U.S. Deterrent Survival Options

Objectives Met

	Offense-only Option @$330 b.	SDI Option @ $185 b.
1. Reduce vulnerability of new retaliatory weapons.	yes	yes
2. Reduce vulnerability of old retaliatory weapons.	no	yes
3. Protect against accidental attack.	no	yes
4. Protect against rogue nation attack or blackmail.	no	yes
5. Reduce risk in arms reduction agreements	no	yes
6. Provide some degree of protection should deterrence fail.	no	yes
7. Provide needed protection from attack for vital U.S. space assets.	no	yes
8. Maximum spin-off to civil economy per tax dollar spent.	no	yes
9. Contribute to restoration of U.S. supremacy in space.	no	yes

TABLE B

Courtesy of High Frontier Inc.

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during the next decade compared to what they will pay if Congress, pressured by the USAF/Industry complex, should elect to stretch out the MAD strategy by buying mobile missile systems as a short term solution to the deterrent problem.

The 25 Billion figure does not include the cost of transporting the proposed SDI satellites into orbit. Since the Brilliant Pebbles system will call for the deployment of over 1000 small satellites, this cost will also be very high using today's space transportation systems – that is either the Shuttle or expendable launch vehicles such as the Titan D-34 or Atlas boosters. Here again major savings can, however, be made. These would not only reduce costs for SDI deployment but also greatly advance the US ability to open up space for civil purposes. In view of this, High Frontier believes that a major effort to achieve such reduced space transportation costs should also be pursued under what we have come to call the SSX program.

What these figures point out is that the present, 1989 Congress could save at least 50 billion by a near-term decision to scrap the MX Mobile missile and Midgetman in favor of funding a Phase I SDI to do the same deterrent job. While other possible adjustments representing major savings associated with shifting the basis of deterrence from revenge to defense are also shown on the chart, this one action – which is currently the alternative under consideration, would prove most helpful in coping with the immediate deficit problem.

The Space Railroad Element

In our view military and civil space activities are both complementary and indivisible. Most of the technologies required for military and civil space operations are the same as are many of the transportation vehicles and systems that are needed to get from the ground into orbit – the so called "space railroad".

A rocket is a rocket whether its passengers are war-

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heads or astronauts. A satellite is a satellite whether to observe clouds or enemy forces and installations. And, the communications, computer, maintenance, and supply needs for all of these are essentially the same. There is more commonalty as between military and civil operations in space than there ever has been on the ground and this has been a major factor in the prolific non military spinoffs derived from the SDI research program to date.

Progress in both civil and military space developments and activities has, in recent years, not only suffered from the stand down prompted by the Challenger accident and NASA's inability to quickly get flying again, but also from the ever increasing cost of transportation from earth to orbit. $8000 dollars per lb on shuttle vehicles may be tolerable to deploy a few dozen multi-billion-dollar satellites but it is prohibitive when it comes to deploying hundreds or even thousands of SDI intercept vehicles as called for by concepts such as Livermore's Brilliant Pebbles.

The sad part of this is that the exorbitant prices to go a couple of hundred miles up are not inevitable. They appear to be the result of early technological limitations on both engines and structures which have subsequently been overcome plus classic bureaucratic resistance to changing what has become a "way of life" in the space launch community whether or not it makes sense anymore.

Unfortunately, space transportation has not as yet had the opportunity to benefit from free enterprise competition, independence from government over regulation, and freedom from efforts to protect early proprietary systems such as NASA's shuttle vehicles and some of Aerospace Industry's costly, first generation, rockets that are still being sold for lack of anything better.

If the US is to enjoy the economic and security benefits that access to space now promises a first step must be to drastically reduce the cost of getting there. America was not colonized by government subsidized transportation but by individuals and groups that could afford passage on the

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clipper ships and privateers of that era. The same will be true when it comes to the exploitation and colonization of space. When the cost of travel to and from near space becomes roughly competitive with rail or sea transportation, a wide variety of economic and defense opportunities in space will be tested and pursued. The question is can this be done, and if so how soon?

Air and space are one continuum. This is why the Air Force early applied the term Aerospace to many of its systems and activities. Travel by air is a well established and understood means of transportation. Commercial air carriers use relatively safe, man, women, and child rated, vehicles and the cost of air travel is competitive with other means given the time and comfort advantages. We also know the principal elements that determine the cost of a ticket on an airliner. These are the cost of the aircraft, the cost of the energy (fuel) required for the trip, the payroll of the people needed to operate the system, and an appropriate percentage of the systems overhead expenses – insurance, etc and profit.

Obviously these same factors should apply when it comes to costing travel from earth to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). If so this begs the question: " why should it cost a 1000 times more to haul a pound of flesh or cargo from the ground up some 30 to 50 miles to LEO than it costs to haul the same weight from the ground up some 10 or less miles and back down again a few hundred miles away?

Both trips use a vehicle that operates off the ground. Both trips use energy (fuel) to drive it. The only differences are in the vector flown, the environment it traverses, and the drag and gravity forces it has to overcome. Now, all this may sound overly simple and obvious but all the right answers to most problems are simple. This travel cost situation is a classic example of this.

Progress is often made when a "blinding flash of the obvious" strikes an expert wrestling with a difficult problem. This happened recently with regard to this space travel cost situation when one of America's foremost rocket designers,

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Dr. Maxwell W. Hunter, who participated in the design and development of the Thor, Atlas, and Delta missile systems, realized that the rocket systems needed to reach orbital speeds were almost all offsprings of the munitions family instead of new kids in the transportation household.

Once one realizes that whereas airplanes, boats, and trucks are members of the transportation family of vehicles, while today's boosters are essentially modified bullets, the difference in their costs attributable to the differences in their salability characteristics suddenly becomes obvious.

A dominant characteristic of all cost effective transportation vehicles is that they are both reusable and designed to survive most accidents and malfunctions. No one would dream of throwing away a car, boat, or plane after each trip. And, few people would ride in any of these if a minor engine or other mechanical failure resulted in the inevitable loss of the vehicle, passengers, and cargo. Likewise their profitability is a function of how many hours a day they can be in use and how quickly they can be turned around at each destination. It is also a function of how many people it takes to turn them around and operate them.

When one looks at the multi-million-dollar costs of the first generation space rockets, such as Titan, Atlas, or Delta boosters and the consequences of losing them, it is obvious why money has been no consideration when it came to preventing any such losses even on their first test flights.

In order to appreciate the problem associated with using a munition for a transportation vehicle, one only has to imagine what a car would cost if the failure of any part, after engine start, resulted in its total loss and the death of its driver and passengers. The impact on space transportation developments has been to require perfection at any cost in time and money. A most recent example of this was the two years and millions of dollars spent by NASA to make sure that the shuttle's new strap on rockets would perform without any chance of failures.

Conversely, aircraft, cars and other cost effective

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transportation vehicles are designed from the start to "fail safe." Both the vehicles and their occupants are savable whatever happens short of catastrophic explosions. They can also be progressively tested throughout their flight regimes. This allows them to be made out of the least expensive, though adequate, materials.

For instance a new aircraft is first taxied and the wheels and brakes are checked. It is then lifted a few feet off the runway and its takeoff, landing, and airborne performance is checked. It is then flown within gliding range of the field and its flight characteristics are checked. At no time in this progression are either the vehicles or their pilots at serious risk. Both are designed to be safely recovered, repaired, and reused in the event of the majority of possible failures. This applies both in the test and development phases and throughout their use as transportation vehicles. But, this has not so far been the case with rockets.

Having grasped this difference in salability, as between rocket and air transportation systems, its cost implications are apparent. It also begs the question: "Can we make rocket powered transportation systems savable and evolve them in the same way we do aircraft?" The answer here is "YES". We can establish safety through salability as a primary requirement as is the case for all other successful transportation vehicles but which, surprisingly, has not been done in the case of space transportation ones.

To make savable rocket vehicles we have to design these with clusters of rocket engines such that the failure of several will not be catastrophic. Admittedly we have to pay a price in weight or complexity of pumps and other systems but this is nothing compared to the indirect costs incurred by having to send men or multi-million-dollar cargoes on trips astride a bullet.

Several companies have tried in recent years to get the development funding to build inexpensive space transportation systems. Most of these, such as Pacific American's Phoenix and Liberty systems would be Vertical Take Off and

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Vertical Landing Rockets (VTOVL). In other words they would go up and down just like the lunar landing vehicle did in the Apollo program. While most of these have not provided for safe recovery from failures in all phases of their flight they are not "throw aways" as are most current rocket launchers nor would they require long runways or thousands of people to ensure their safe operation.

More recently Dr. Hunter has proposed immediate development of a Single Stage Experimental Rocket (SSX). It would be built from state of the art technologies and enjoy complete salability at any point along its trajectory, except for highly unlikely catastrophic failures. Some top rocket engineers who are Hunter's colleagues agree that we could have a cheap, reliable, and fully tested, space transportation system in less than four years time for under 1 Billion dollars. This works out to less cost per year than for one shuttle flight.

The SSX program we propose involves building three (3) rocket propelled experimental transportation vehicles. This is a relatively low risk effort that could be completed and tested by the 1992 elections. The SSX-1 would do for space transportation what the X-1 aircraft did for supersonic air systems. The SSX is a Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO) vehicle designed from the ground up as a man, woman, and child rated transportation system. This program would prove that earth to space transportation can be made compatible with air transportation both safety and cost wise. It would also obviously open up space to many military and civil activities whose return on investment would not permit going there at today's travel costs.

Of more immediate interest, however, are the massive cost savings associated with adopting this new method of going to and from space. Given a safe, 50 dollar a pound, transport system the taxpayers would save billions on the deployment and insurance costs for all future communications, weather, navigations and other satellites plus what we would otherwise have to pay to deploy the 1000 or more

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Brilliant Pebble SDI defensive system.

A safe system such as SSX would not require the costly standing army of retainers, refurbishers, and managers that are now needed to launch today's Shuttles and expendable boosters. Conservative estimates are that NASA requires on the order of 10,000 people to check out and launch a Shuttle. If we divide total number of airline employees by the number of commercial aircraft in the US commercial fleet it comes out to under 150 per aircraft including ticket takers. The SSX should require less than 500 people to launch even in small numbers of rockets. These numbers would decrease dramatically with increases in the numbers launched per year.

High Frontier is convinced that the Hunter proposal offers the best, cheapest, and least expensive way to make a dramatic reduction in space transportation costs. We believe the government has been remiss in not funding, at minimum the development and testing of such a system.

The SSX concept is not fundamentally new. It's advantages and desirability have been recognized by both rocket experts and space buffs for years. Unfortunately, the longer we relied on putting saddles on bullets to go to space, and the more jobs and dollars became committed to this costly and wasteful approach, the greater has been the resistance to any effort that might make obsolete today's way of life. Obviously a successful SSX demonstration would put today's million-dollar rockets and shuttles, and an army of bureaucrats required to operate and support these, out of business.

General Abrahamson's SDI office in the Pentagon has supported some research in this area but all space supporters should demand more of both defense and NASA, wherein protection of bureaucratic jobs and monopolies seem to have taken priority over US national interests. If this is not true then the only alternative explanation is technological incompetence or ignorance which is worse.

At $10 a lb, I and many other American's could hope

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to spend a weekend in an orbital hotel before we spend eternity in a graveyard. It is up to us to make it happen. There are no more technological or even economic barriers, only shortcomings in political leadership. If the government won't do it, then the private sector should. Please join us in bringing this about.

The Space Control Element

The "best approach to deterrence" issue has been further complicated by the space factor. First, a truly cost effective missile defense system will require a major space based component. Satellites are essential to warning of and locating oncoming missiles. They are also essential to controlling and guiding the defensive responses. Of more importance to effectiveness, however, is a need for a multi-layered defense with emphasis on catching as many oncoming missiles in their boost phase when they are slow, easiest to hit, and carry most profitable targets while their multiple warheads are still on board. This requires space based anti missile systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.

It is common knowledge that the Soviets have slowly but steadily sought to achieve a leading world position in space development, exploration and use. After they opened up the High Frontier with Sputnik in 1958, the US took a great leap ahead of them with its Apollo man on the moon program of the 1960's. In recent years the Soviet have established a strong presence in space, acquired extensive operational experience with men in space on their MIR space station, and invested far more money and effort than the US has, especially in military space activities. During this same period US setbacks such as the Challenger accidents, haphazard spending on space efforts, and waste resulting from division if not bickering between military and civil space efforts have badly eroded the US leadership gained by Apollo.

Here again, as in the case of the need to perpetuate deterrence, the one thing the military and strategists of all

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nations understand is that space is the new High Ground when it comes to military power and capabilities. What this means in clear simple terms is that any nation or group of nations that might acquire sufficient control over near space to prevent the access to, and use of, this new environment by others, for military or civil purposes, would dominate not only near space but the earth below. Just as past aggressors or defenders who succeeded in controlling the high seas, and later the air, won all wars in their time so will any who succeed in controlling access to and from space be able to determine the outcome of future wars on earth. This is not guess work or supposition, its history.

The emergence of this new element in national security when coupled with the role space systems must play in deterrence based on defenses, suggests that space control considerations are inextricably combined with any actions and decisions on deterrence. In this day and age it is irrational to debate and decide upon any deterrent strategy without considering space based defense systems. Peace and deterrence can no longer be achieved solely by earth based military forces, weapon systems, and supporting capabilities.

When President Reagan said in his 1983 speech that SDI could make nuclear weapons obsolete and eliminate the balance of terror, he no doubt recognized that missile defenses would eliminate the decisive role that weapons of mass destruction, such as ICBM's, have played under MAD in national security and in the east west power balance. This means these weapons could become obsolete and negotiable for elimination. The time has now come when this process can and should be initiated.

Not only is space control likely to become the dominant security consideration by the turn of the century, but the ability or not to exploit the resources and potential of space may well determine the Free World's and Soviet's ability to grow and maintain their standards of living.

Space is the new frontier. If history teaches us anything it is that this frontier will be crossed, colonized, exploited

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and developed for any and all purposes that look promising when technology and money permits. The Soviets perceive this all too clearly and we should. This is not to say either side has to fight for and dominate space. There is plenty of room out there to go around. What it does tell us though is that no nation can afford to allow another to deny it access to space, and that the potential advantages to be derived, both on earth and in space, from controlling access are such that it would not be human nor logical for aggressor nations not to try if given the chance.

The Bottom Line

It is in the long term interest of the United States to deduce its deficit.

This could be done by reducing defense spending across the board and in the process reducing the effectiveness of all aspects of the national security effort.

It could also be done by cutting back on major defense tasks such as defending NATO, the Pacific Ocean Area, or the ability to protect areas like the Persian Gulf in a crises.

It can also be done by doing all those things we have been doing, or that are deemed essential we do in the near term, but by doing them in ways that are less costly and often more effective.

If we wish to assume that all things now being done are being done in the most cost effective manner, which is not true, there still remains the obvious possibility of exploiting new technologies to do the job in a less costly manner.

The least provocative and controversial approach to realizing economies in defense is to adopt the later course of action.

By exploiting advances in structures and rocket engines, and by optimizing space transport vehicles for transportation purposes, we can greatly reduce the cost of travel to and from inner space.

By changing the basis of deterrence from threatening unacceptable levels of revenge to preventing successful use of

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military force in the first place we can save billions of dollars in retaliatory force schemes and systems.

Both these approaches to long term US security at less cost can help solve the near term deficit problem. Given present US economic and world conditions it is unconscionable for US leaders not to pursue them.

Footnotes

1. SHAPE Headquarters presentations (1950's), personal files of the author.
2. Memorandum to Department of Defense, 9 February 1989, "End of Tour Report," by Lt. General J.A. Abrhamson, Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

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PREVENTION OF CANCER AND CORONARY HEART DISEASE AND THE REDUCTION IN THE COST OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

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Introduction

The argument of this paper may be put in the form of a syllogism:

1) Preventive medicine is more cost-effective and in action more humane than curative medicine.
2) There now exist brief and inexpensive psychological methods having powerful prophylactic effects in connection with cancer and coronary heart disease (CHD), the two major killing diseases of this century.
3) Therefore, society can benefit tremendously by making use of these methods in preventing disease.

I will not argue explicitly in favor of the major premise; it is too obviously true to require explication. Obviously it will be better for people to *avoid* dying of cancer or CHD, than to be treated after the event with methods which may not prevent death in any case, but which are almost certain to destroy the quality of life of the patient, even if they succeed in preventing death. Considering cost-effectiveness, the hideous expense for the individual involved in suffering from a major disease is too well known to require discussion. Similarly, insurance is very expensive, with costs going up annually. Countries like the U.K., relying on a state-supported National Health System, are spending a high

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proportion of the national income on an ever-increasing demand for health care.

Thus both humanitarian and economic arguments suggest the need to look for methods of prevention, as far as the major killer diseases are concerned. Medicine has tried to go in that direction by blaming cigarette smoking, wrong dietary habits and other physical causes, yet the suggested remedies (giving up smoking, using a less cholesterol producing diet) have little empirical support. As an example we may look at the famous Mr. Fit program (Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial), which attempted to show the benefits of getting people to smoke less, adopt a healthier diet, and reduce high blood-pressure when necessary (Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial Research Group, 1982).

From a general point of view, this study is an example of the type of study of groups which are not self-selected, but include a measure of randomization. In this randomized primary prevention trial to test the effect of a multifactor intervention program on mortality from coronary heart disease, 12,866 high-risk men aged 35-57 years were randomly assigned either to a special intervention program consisting of drug treatment for hypertension, counseling for cigarette smoking, and dietary advice for lowering blood cholesterol levels, or to the usual resources of health care in the community. An average follow-up period of 7 years showed that risk factor levels declined in both groups, but to an insignificantly greater degree for the experimental group. Mortality from coronary heart disease was 17.9 deaths per thousand in the experimental group and 19.3 deaths per thousand in the control group, a statistically nonsignificant difference. Total mortality rates were 41.2 per thousand in the experimental group and 40.4 per thousand in the control group, that is, mortality was greater in the experimental than in the control group. Thus, the effect of lowering significantly the consumption of cigarettes (as well as significantly lowering blood cholesterol levels and also lowering blood pressure) was practically nonexistent; the slightly greater

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mortality rate for the experimental group can hardly be taken seriously. The results as far as coronary heart disease are concerned will be discussed again later on; the overall mortality rate, however, is important because it includes cancers, and should have declined as a consequence of the lower levels of cigarette consumption in the experimental group. This is important in view of the statements, made in the U. S. Surgeon General's Report (1982, p.5), that "Cigarette smokers have overall mortality rates substantially greater than those of non-smokers," and that it would be expected that giving up cigarette smoking would reduce these overall mortality rates. Apparently this is not so overall, and, as other studies have shown, it is not so with respect to cancers specifically.

One last word must be said about the multiple risk factor intervention trial. The reasons advanced after the fact to explain away the disappointing results (see Oliver, 1982), if they are to be taken seriously, suggest that the large group of specialists who planned this 115 million dollar trial were incompetent to a degree that seems hardly credible. Attempts to salvage isolated positive findings from the overall negative result go counter to the spirit of statistical inquiry; individual comparisons, taken by themselves, cannot be subjected to the usual statistical calculus of probabilities, as they constitute a selected one or two out of a more numerous number of comparisons made.

It should be noted that other trials, such as the continuing World Health Organization European Trial, which comprises 63,733 men aged 40-59 in 44 parent factories in Britain, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Spain (World Health Organization European Collaborative Group, 1982) also makes depressing reading in that changes were smaller than expected and not completely consistent or sustained. The authors found that, despite an estimated fall of 145 in coronary heart disease risk in the whole group and of 245 in the high-risk sub-group after 4 years, no equivalent fall in incidence of coronary heart disease might be shown even in

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a study of this size. Similarly, in the North Jarelia project (Puska et al., 1979), an overall mean net reduction of 17% in men and of 123 in women occurred 5 years after inception with regard to cigarette smoking, blood pressure, and plasma cholesterol concentrations in the intervention community, compared with the control community, but here also there was no reduction in mortality from coronary heart disease. Only the small-scale Oslo study (Hjermann et al., 1981) succeeded in showing a reduction in the incidence of coronary heart disease with cessation of smoking and dietary intervention to lower lipid concentrations in non-hypertensive men in high-risk categories. Overall, the outlook is not promising, although better designed, better-controlled and longer-continued studies might alter the outlook. All one can say is that attempts to prove the influence of cigarette smoking as a causal factor in disease by means of trials avoiding the obvious error of self-selection have not on the whole been successful.

The studies so far mentioned have all dealt in the main with coronary heart disease, and it might be thought that the results might not apply to lung cancer. There is, however, the report by Rose *et al.* (1978) of a ten-year follow-up study of middle-aged male smokers at high risk of cardiorespiratory disease who were allocated randomly to an intervention or a normal care group. The intensive advice given to the first group was successful in reducing the average consumption of cigarettes by just over one half in this group. In the normal care group of 731 men, 25 cases of lung cancer were reported; in the intervention group of 714, there were 22 comparable cases – a non-significant difference. Data for all deaths in these groups are free from diagnostic error, and are hence the most reliable: 17.2% in the intervention group died compared with 17.5% in the normal care group, giving a negligible and statistically nonsignificant difference. Thus, this study gives results similar to the other intervention studies using randomized groups – *a failure to detect any effect of giving up smoking*. Curiously, Rose *et al.* found at a sig-

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nificant level of $p<0.003$ that the intervention group subjects had a much higher rate of "all cancers other than lung cancer" than the non-intervention group subjected (p.106); whether this result can be replicated is, of course, another matter, particularly since there are difficulties in assigning a valid probability value to an a *posteriori* hypothesis. Burch (1983) comments that, for all these studies, the results for total mortality are entirely in line with the analysis of temporal trends of sex and age-specific mortality from all causes in the whole of England and Wales (Burch, 1983), which "failed to detect any causal influence of cigarette smoking when consumption was rising and no prophylactic influence when consumption was falling" (p.832).

These studies use *randomization* of treatment and control samples, an indispensable requisite for studies of this kind. Non-randomized studies have reported some alleged positive effects of quitting smoking (for review, see Eysenck, 1986), but these studies are subject to a vital flaw. As Friedman *et al.* (1979) have shown when quitters are compared with smokers and non-smokers at the time of quitting (i.e. before this could have had any effect on their health), they are *already* more like non-smokers than smokers, health-wise. Thus any differences from continuing smokers may be due, not to quitting, but to already apparent differences in health.

It is not our intention here to argue that quitting smoking is not a wise move, or that it has no effect on one's future health; it would be irresponsible to argue along these lines. We are merely concerned to point out that the effects on cancer and C.H.D. of quitting are doubtful and at best small, compared with the effects of changing psychological factors by means of psychotherapy. We will now turn to a discussion of these factors.

Stress, Personality and Disease

Recent years have seen the quickly spreading use of behaviour therapy in psychiatry, i.e. a behaviouristic method of psychotherapy opposed to Freudian or "dynamic" ap-

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proaches, and based on principles of Pavlovian conditioning and learning theory generally. In this section we will try to establish the principle that there is a close relationship between cancer and CHD, on the one hand, and stressed personality, on the other. The occurrence in the future of these diseases can be predicted with considerable accuracy on the basis of personality inventories enquiring into experienced stress, and personality differences in dealing with these stresses. The next section will demonstrate that short-term psychotherapy can so alter personality and behavior as to reduce considerably the risks of both cancer and coronary heart disease.

In this section we have quoted some reviews of the field, but have concentrated in the main on our own prospective studies. This was done because these link up closely with our intervention studies which establish the possibility of using psychotherapy for prophylactic purposes.

The identification of behaviour therapy with the application of learning theory to problems of behaviour (Eysenck, 1959) has lead to a considerable amount of research and application in the field of psychiatry, and has also given rise to a good deal of theoretical advance (Eysenck & Martin, 1988). It would be quite wrong, however, to imagine that psychiatry is the only area in medicine to which the principles of behaviour therapy can be applied. Eysenck (1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b) and Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck & Vetter (1988) have shown that these principles can be applied with equal success in the area of physical disease, notably cancer and coronary heart disease. These studies demonstrate the value of "holistic medicine", i.e. the view that personality, motivation, stress and other psychological factors play an important part in the interaction between disease process, immune reaction, and outcome. In order to understand these processes, it is necessary to give up the Cartesian notion of body-mind dichotomy, and instead adopt the view of a "body-mind continuum, just as physicists now speak of a space-time continuum, rather than regarding space and

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time as being qualitatively different.

The view that certain personality types are cancer-prone, or prone to other diseases, goes back at least as far as Hippocrates and his followers, who spoke of melancholia constituting the essential personality feature antedating cancer. Many medical observers have since suggested a variety of personality traits as being characteristic of the cancer-prone personality, including such traits as being over-cooperative, appeasing, unassertive, over-patient, avoiding conflict, being compliant with external authorities, suppressing emotions such as anxiety and anger, and having difficulties in coping with interpersonal stress, leading to feelings of helplessness, hopelessness and depression. Following the Type A-Type B terminology, supposedly characterizing a coronary heart disease-prone personality and its opposite, the cancer-prone type has recently been named "Type C" (Baltrusch, Stangel, and Waltz, 1988). The whole concept of the "disease-prone personality" has recently been examined by Friedman and Booth-Kewley (1987). They conclude that there is sufficient evidence to argue for a key role for psychological research on the prevention and treatment of disease. (p.539) A detailed argument for the holistic approach to medicine can be found in Pena (1983).

The personality characteristics of the coronary heart disease-prone person are in many ways different from those of the cancer-prone personality. Rosenman and Chesney (1980) has summarized research on the Type A-Type B concept, which has not fared too well in respect to predictive accuracy (Eysenck, in press). What does seem predictive is an exaggerated anger response, combined with strong feelings of hostility and aggression; in this clearly the coronary heart disease-prone person differs markedly from the cancer-prone person. There is also some similarity however, in the sense that coronary heart disease-prone persons also find difficulties in coping with interpersonal stress (Booth-Kewley and Friedman, 1987; Krantz and Manuck, 1984).

Earlier evidence for the relationship between personality

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and disease has been reviewed by Eysenck (1985). We shall here be concerned with some recent studies which have built on these established relationships in order to identify cancer-prone and coronary heart disease-prone individuals, and which have then gone on to use the principles of behaviour therapy to change behaviour patterns in the direction of a healthier type of personality (Eysenck, 1988; Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck and Vetter, 1988; Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck, Vetter and Frentzel-Beyme, 1988).

In the three studies to be briefly summarized, individuals were selected on a semi-random basis (with restrictions on age and sex composition), and were administered a personality inventory constructed in such a way as to embody theories concerning cancer-prone and coronary heart disease-prone personality, and were then followed up over a period of ten years or more, when death and cause of death were ascertained. Altogether probands were allocated to one of four types. Type 1 is the cancer-prone type; Type 2 is the coronary heart disease-prone type; Type 3 is a mixed type presumed relatively immune to cancer and coronary heart disease; and Type 4 is the healthy, autonomous type. More detailed information on these types, together with the inventories used for their measurement, is given in a paper by Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck & Vetter, (1988).

The first of the samples was collected in Yugoslavia, and constitutes a random sample of mainly elderly people. The second sample was collected in Heidelberg, and constitutes a normal sample, rather younger than the Yugoslav one, selected along quota lines. The third sample was constituted of persons who were nominated as suffering from marked interpersonal stress, the nominations coming from members of the second sample. The Heidelberg "stressed" sample is similar in age and sex composition to the Heidelberg "normal" sample, the only difference being the incidence of stress. This enables us to study the importance of stress as far as mortality from cancer, coronary heart disease and other causes is concerned.

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The results for the Yugoslav study are shown in Table 1; it will be seen that as predicted Type 1 probands die of cancer rather than coronary heart disease, while Type 2 persons die of coronary heart disease rather than of cancer. Type 3 and Type 4 show much less mortality from these causes.

Table 1: Death from cancer and CHD according to personality: Yugoslav study.

	Alive	Cancer	Infarct/ Stroke	Other	Total
Type 1	76=25.1%	140=46.2%	25=8.3%	62=20.5%	303
Type 2	101=29.8%	19=5.6%	99=29.2%	120=35.4%	339
Type 3	129=59.4%	4=1.8%	20=9.2%	64=29.5%	217
Type 4	438=90.9%	3=0.6%	8=1.7%	33=6.8%	482
Unclass.	6	0	4	2	12
Total	750=55.4%	166=12.3%	156=11.5%	281=20.8%	1353

Table 2 shows the results for the Heidelberg "normal" sample. Mortality here of course is much less, as the sample is much younger than the Yugoslav one; nevertheless, here too Type 1 tends to die of cancer, Type 2 of coronary heart disease. Type 3 and Type 4 are healthy and show very little in the way of mortality.

Table 2: Death from cancer and CHD according to personality type: Heidelberg "normal" study.

	Alive	Cancer	Infarct/ Stroke	Other	Total
Type 1	78=71.6%	19=17.4%	2=1.8%	10=9.2%	109
Type 2	109=64.1%	10=5.9%	23=13.5%	28=16.5%	170
Type 3	185=98.4%	0	1=0.5%	2=1.1%	188
Type 4	387=99.0%	0	1=0.3%	3=0.8%	391
Unclass.	14	0	0	0	14
Total	773=88.6%	29=3.3%	27=3.1%	43=4.9%	872

Table 3 shows the results for the Heidelberg "stressed" sample. Mortality here is very significantly higher than for the Heidelberg "normal" sample, indicating the importance

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

Fig. 1. Death from cancer and CHD according to personality type: Yugoslav study. (Eysenck 1988b)

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of stress for mortality. The figures again show Type 1 much more liable to die of cancer, Type 2 of coronary heart disease. Here too, Type 3 and Type 4 are relatively immune to these diseases.

Table 3: Death from cancer and CHD according to personality type: Heidelberg "stressed" study.

	Alive	Cancer	Infarct/ Stroke	Other	Total
Type 1	188=38.4%	188=38.4%	34=7.0%	79=16.2%	48
Type 2	148=47.9%	7=2.3%	86=27.8%	68=22.0%	309
Type 3	153=92.7%	4=2.4%	0	8=4.8%	165
Type 4	71=97.3	0	0	2=2.7%	73
Unclass.	6	0	0	0	6
Total	566=19.1%	199=19.1%	120=11.5%	157=15.1%	1042

Figures 1, 2 and 3 show in diagrammatic form the results of these studies. They demonstrate a very clear-cut statistical relationship between personality and disease. It might be thought that perhaps such factors as blood pressure, cholesterol, or amount of smoking might be wholly or in part responsible for these differences, but this is not so. We have analyzed these relationships in detail (Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck, Vetter, 1988), and have found "that personality is something like six times as important as these factors taken together. Smoking, in particular, was found to correlate with disease only in people who were cancer-prone or coronary heart disease-prone by personality; there was no correlation for Type 3 and Type 4.

Psychotherapy as a Prophylactic Agent for Cancer and CHD

The results discussed so far are of course entirely correlational; they suggest but do not prove the existence of a causal relationship between personality and disease. To make such a causal relationship more likely, we carried out several intervention studies, in which an attempt was made

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

Fig. 2. Death from cancer and CHD according to personality type: Heidelberg "normal" study. (Eysenck 1988b)

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to use the principles of behaviour therapy to alter the behaviours characteristic of Types 1 and 2 in the direction of the behaviours characteristic of Type 4, i.e. the achievement of greater autonomy, a less repressive attitude towards emotional expression, and most of all the learning of coping mechanism to deal with the interpersonal stresses so prominent in persons of Type 1 and Type 2. A detailed description of the methods used is given elsewhere (Grossarth-Maticek and Eysenck, in press). Here we will concentrate on the results of these intervention studies.

The general scheme followed in the three studies to be described was always the same. Subjects were collected on the basis of not suffering from cancer, heart disease or any other debilitative illness. Only persons of Type 1 or Type 2 were used in these studies, and they were assigned on a random basis to either a control or a treatment group. They were then followed up for varying periods, and finally death and cause of death were ascertained on the basis of death certificates. The randomization process ensures the applicability of the normal tests of significance, and at the same time equalizes the influence of other factors, such as smoking, medication, etc.

In the first of these studies, we used 100 cancer-prone probands and 92 coronary heart disease-prone probands. The total numbers were divided in two to make a control and a therapy group, and probands were followed up for a period of 13 years. The results are shown in Table 4; it will be seen that the method of behaviour therapy used, involving individual treatment for between 25 and 30 hours in all, at the beginning of the follow-up period, was very effective in preventing both cancer and coronary heart disease. Clearly, long term individual behaviour therapy can be very effective as a prophylactic means of preventing cancer in cancer-prone probands, and coronary heart disease in coronary heart disease-prone probands.

In the second study, we used group therapy, applying the same principles to groups of around 20 probands. The

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

Fig. 3. Death from cancer and CHD according to personality type: Heidelberg "stressed" study. (Eysenck 1988b)

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Table 4: Effect of prophylactic behaviour therapy on cancer prone and CHD prone probands.

In Heidelberg stressed sample

		Deceased from		
Risk: cancer	Alive	Other	Cancer	Total
Control Group	19	15	16	50
Therapy Group	45	5	0	50
Total	64	20	16	100

In Heidelberg stressed sample

		Deceased from		
Risk: infarct/stroke	Alive	Other	Infarct/ stroke	Total
Control Group	17	13	16	46
Therapy Group	37	6	3	46
Total	54	19	19	92

groups met a number of times totalling between 6 and 30 hours, depending on the wishes of the group. The therapy group and the control group both contained 245 randomly assigned probands of Type 1 or Type 2, and it will be seen from Table 5 that group therapy also was very effective in preventing death from cancer or coronary heart disease in the therapy group, as compared with the control group. Here the follow-up period was 8 years.

Table 5: Deaths from cancer and other causes in control and therapy subjects: Group therapy.

	Therapy Group		Control Group	
'N'	245		245	
Untraceable	6		11	
Follow-up group	239		234	
Died of:				
Cancer	18		111	
CHD	10	48	36	180

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Other causes	20	33
Still Living	191	56

In the third of these prophylactic studies, we used short individual therapy, aided by a printed leaflet setting out aims and methods of the treatment, which was given to the probands to keep and read repeatedly. The one-hour treatment was administered by students who had been taught the principles of behaviour therapy as applied to physical disease. There was a therapy group of 600, a control group of 500, and a placebo group of 100 who received "dynamic" type therapy, and a leaflet outlining the principles of dynamic psychotherapy as applied to physical disease. This placebo treatment was introduced in order to test the possibility that simply interacting with probands might have a beneficial effect. Table 6 outlines the results; it will be clear that therapy has a profound effect as compared with placebo treatment, which was no better than the complete lack of treatment in the control group. No detailed probability statistics are given as these are well below the .001 level in all 3 studies. The follow-up period was 10 years.

Table 6: Deaths from cancer and other causes in control, placebo and therapy subjects: short individual therapy.

	Died of Cancer No. %	Died of CHD No. %	Other Causes of Death No. %	Total Deaths No. %	Still Living No. %
Groups:					
1–Control (N=500)	106 21	145 29	164 33	415 83	78 16
2–Placebo (N=100)	22 22	31 31	28 28	81 81	19 19
3–Therapy (N=600)	27 4	47 8	115 19	189 32	409 68

(Seven persons in Group 1 and two in Group 3 could not be traced.)

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Psychosocial Factors, Prophylactic Treatment and Hospital Stay

It might be predicted from the data so far given that the cancer-prone and the CHD-prone probands would be more likely to use medical and hospital services than probands of Type 3 or 4, even when we exclude periods preceding deaths by 12 month (so that the actual disease would not have too profound an influence on the data). Table 7 gives data for our 3 prospective studies. They show each time that probands of Type 1 and Type 2 make approximately equal demands on hospital services, as far as number of days in hospital is concerned. Type 3 seems to make somewhat larger demands in the Yugoslav study, but not in the Heidelberg ones. This may be related to the greater age of the Yugoslav sample. We have found in a 20-year follow-up of this group that probands of Type 4 are very significantly more longevitous than probands of Type 3, so that hospitalization in old age occurs earlier for Type 3 than for Type 4.

Table 7: Hospital stay in days: Average values for 4 personality types in 3 prospective studies.

Personality and Duration of Hospital Stay			
	N:	Information lacking:	Average stay in hospital in days
Type 1	109	31	29
Type 2	170	39	28
Type 3	188	41	7
Type 4	391	62	5
Heidelberg "normal" sample, 1972-1985			
Type 1	303	42	16
Type 2	339	35	14
Type 3	217	19	13
Type 4	482	50	4
Yugoslav sample, 1966-1986			

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Type 1	489	72	39
Type 2	309	60	38
Type 3	165	24	3
Type 4	73	5	1

Heidelberg "stressed" sample, 1972-1986

Does psychotherapy reduce the need for hospital treatment? We have some figures for the 192 probands constituting the sample discussed in connection with Table 4. Thus we have 100 probands of Type 1 (cancer-prone) and 92 probands of Type 2 (CHD-prone), with both samples randomly divided into a control and a treatment group. In each group (Therapy and Control), one person is missing due to failure to ascertain duration of hospital stay, thus there are effectively 95 control and 95 therapy probands. During the 10-year period preceding treatment, both groups averaged about equal duration of hospital stay (15 days for the therapy group, 10 days for the treatment group). It is in the 12-year period *after* therapy that we observe a profound difference. The average stay of the therapy group falls by 9 days to 6 days; that of the control group rises by 26 (!) days to 42. This is largely but not wholly due to the much greater incidence of cancer and CHD in this group.

These data suggest that psychosocial factors cause probands of Type 1 and Type 2 to spend roughly *8 times* as many days in hospital as probands of Type 4, the healthy type. Probands of Type 3 are more likely to spend time in the hospital than probands of Type 4, but only when both groups have reached retirement age. Hospitalization can be reduced very significantly by psychotherapy, largely preventing the occurrence of cancer and CHD. The evidence directly implicates psychosocial factors in duration of hospital treatment.

Discussion and Conclusion

It is suggested that the data here presented strongly support the argument made in the introductory syllogism.

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Prevention of serious diseases, such as cancer and CHD, is possible through the prophylactic use of a special type of behaviour therapy. This therapy is required only by a small subsection of the population, namely probands of Type 1 and Type 2, making up less than one-third of the population, and ascertainable by means of a single questionnaire. No doubt the instruments used can be improved psychometrically and in other ways, and prediction made even more precise. In other later studies we have used a dynamic application of a new version of our inventory, letting 6 months elapse between administrations. We then score the change according to *improvement* (D for development), in the sense that scores on Type 1 and 2 are reduced, and scores on Type 3 and 4 increased, or *worsening* (S for stagnation), in the sense that scores on Type 1 and 2 are increased, and scores on Type 3 and 4 decreased.

Table 8 shows the results for probands of Type 1 and Type 2; it will be clear that the dual application of the measure makes prediction much more precise. This suggests that only about 20% of the population are cancer-prone or CHD-prone, and require behaviour therapy to avoid these diseases.

Our discussion so far has been in terms of facts and figures, remaining on an academic level throughout. The practical implications, i.e. the greater use of prognostic testing using psychosocial inventories concerned with personality and stress, have been indicated, as well as the possibilities inherent in the use of behaviour therapies as a prophylactic agent.

It is not our intention here to go beyond this point, and attempt to indicate the manner in which such proposals could actually be introduced into the practical workings of medicine. The problems and difficulties are obviously immense. First, there is the overt hostility shown by traditional, orthodox medicine to the very notion of "holistic" medicine, the introduction of psychosocial concepts like "stress" and "personality", and the use of behavioural rather

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than medical techniques. This hostility is clearly shown by the refusal of orthodox medicine to make available funds for the advancement of research into the forbidden areas.

Table 8: Prediction of death from different causes in probands of Types 1 and 2 according to stagnation (S) or development (D) of scores over 6 months.

		Died of			
		Cancer:	CHD	Other Causes	Still Living
Type 1	S (82)	38	11	15	21
	D (71)	3	4	5	59
Type 2	S (104)	17	49	25	13
	D (84)	1	10	7	66

Secondly, there is the problem of education and training. Who is to teach the appropriate methods of behaviour therapy to doctors and psychologists able and willing to learn them? Who will pay for the training, the setting-up of appropriate organizations, and the resources necessary for the implementation of a large-scale programme? There would be a large saving *in the long run*, but politicians are notoriously concerned rather with the short run! These and many other practical problems we leave quite happily to others, better qualified to deal with them than we are. We can only hope, for the sake of millions of people whose lives could be saved by the initiation of such a programme, that the very real practical difficulties do not lead to a failure to introduce these normal procedures for the prevention of disease.

As an intermediate goal, however, we would suggest the immediate setting-up, at a high level, of a replication

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research undertaking to investigate on an independent basis, the replicability of our results in the U.S.A. Replication is the life-blood of science, and cultural, racial and national differences may stand in the way of applying findings, however securely based, cross-culturally. Considering that $115 million were easily found to fund the abortive, badly planned and poorly executed Mr. Fit research, it should not be too hard, provided that the will was there, to test our theories and replicate our findings. It would of course also be important to extend the scope of the research by introducing various additional techniques, in particular immunological assays, repeated several times in the follow-up of control and therapy groups. Only in this way will we be able to understand the complex and obscure ways in which personality, stress, therapy, immunology, cancer and CHD interact. We have too long obeyed the shibboleth of "Smoking causes cancer and CHD," hoping that quitting smoking would eliminate these two scourges. There are other, more important factors in the genesis of cancer and CHD, and it is time the medical establishment woke up to reality.

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THE NEW HEGEMONY: DENG XIAOPING'S CHINA FACES THE WORLD

By Julian Weiss

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Author Julian Weiss examines the negotiating techniques of the PRC government during recent years, and finds that despite Beijing's new "opening to the world" in economic affairs, and less activist pose in relation to Third World countries generally, the official government position still exhibits signs of a policy aimed at ensuring ultimate Chinese "hegemony" at least on the Asian scene.

The PRC attitude toward Hong Kong and Macao, as exhibited in negotiations with the British and Portuguese government, revealed no effort to meet the concerns of the decolonizing powers to any discernible degree, every care being taken to ensure that Beijing would have ultimately full control over the populations of these two territories once they had been absorbed into the People's Republic of China. Similarly, despite propaganda concerning self-determination in Tibet, the historical record shows that no consideration has been extended to Tibetan public opinion or wishes, and that Beijing has remained determined to follow its own goals in Tibet, notwithstanding lip-service to local autonomy.

The implications for current PRC-Taiwan negotiations are also examined.

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NORTH KOREA: INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO DYNAMIC SUCCESSION

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Kim Il-song, 76, absolute ruler of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, is attempting to protect his legacy with the fervor of an Egyptian Pharaoh preparing for the afterlife. But his reign is winding down against the backdrop of economic stagnation and, despite his careful planning, political uncertainty. Pyongyang's internal affairs, as a result, are likely to become as important to the stability of Northeast Asia as South Korean politics have been in the wake of popular unrest and the runup to the 1988 Olympics. The fact that so much less is known about events in Pyongyang than turmoil in Seoul makes the North's future — and its regional impact — even harder to predict.

Socialism in One Family

Kim's concern is simply stated. How can he prevent the posthumous denigration of his life and work that devoured Stalin after 1956 and Mao Zedong after the defeat of the Gang of Four? Kim Il-song certainly is aware of the factional strife that has choked Korean history,[1] and is too shrewd a politician to believe his immortality is safer than those of the other great communist dictators.

His answer is equally simple. Choose a successor who is absolutely dependent on the preservation of Kim's stature and assure the transfer of power before the Great Leader dies.

Finding such a person was also relatively uncomplicated, given Korea's confucian and shamanistic heritage and the few people Kim Il-song would trust. After a brief experiment

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with his younger brother around the time of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Fifth Congress in 1970, he settled on Kim Chong-il, his son by his first wife.

The younger Kim has been brought along gradually, probably in order to test his aptitudes, develop his skills, and avoid giving the impression that the Great Leader's demise was imminent. By the mid-1970s, according to Morgan Clippinger[2] and others, Kim Chong-il apparently was in charge of party personnel policy, presumably enabling him to place officials beholden to him in important posts. During this period, the North Korean media referred to his greatness directly, but not always explicitly, praising the accomplishments of the "Party Center" when not hailing the younger Kim by name.

Kim Chong-il had his "coming out" at the Korean Workers' Party Sixth congress in October 1980. He vaulted onto the Politburo and joined his father and three other leading officials on its standing Committee. Only the two Kims and Defense Minister O Chin-u remained on the latter after the death of Premier Kim Il in 1983 and the demotion of Vice President Yi Chong-ok sometime later. Kim Chong-il also became a party secretary, but did not assume a government post.

Subsequent media treatment of Kim Chong-il escalated gradually. On October 8, 1985 North Korea purchased a full page advertisement in *The New York Times* announcing the publication of a two-volume biography of the "Dear Leaders life, and declaring that "Korea has given birth to one more great hero." It was only in 1986 and 1987, however, that North Korean officials publicly declared that Kim Chong-il was the solution to their country's succession problem.

If the North Korean media is to be believed — and I think it is on this point — the son now seems to be in charge of virtually all aspects of day-to-day life in North Korea. He appears capable of working long hours and is willing to undertake virtually any task. He appears to be an active administrator and directs activities at all levels. In short, he

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seems to fit in well as the heir to a hypercentralized socio-economic system. The younger Kim, in addition, gives the impression of intelligence and cultural sophistication. On the other hand, Kim Chong-il so far has avoided the ceremonial functions and public appearances his charismatic father seems to enjoy. In addition, there is virtually no evidence that Kim Chong-il meets visiting foreign dignitaries or plays any active role in setting foreign policy.

The contrast between the elder Kim's active public persona and his son's apparent inability or unwillingness to inspire his people hurts the regime's effort to advance Kim Chong-il's legitimacy. Kim Il-Song, with his revolutionary credentials and alleged wartime exploits, appears to be a genuine object of national reverence. His philosophy of self-reliance ("Chuche") has provided a rallying cry for people used to periodic humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders. What seems to non-Koreans (not just in the West) as an absurd cult of personality has been effective within the Korean cultural universe in creating a sense of independence and national pride. Moreover, Kim il-Song has been treated as an equal by successive Soviet and Chinese leaders, and has been included as a leader of the nonaligned world by figures ranging from Tito to Sukarno and Prince Sihanouk (who still spends half of each year in Pyongyang).

Kim Chong-il possesses neither charm nor important international friends nor a record of revolutionary accomplishment. Regime propagandists are systematically constructing a life history of spectacular accomplishment for the younger Kim (and his deceased mother as well), but one wonders whether *post hoc* reports of his genius can make up for his clear lack of a heroic presence. More importantly — if persistent reports in the Japanese press that North Korea is short of food and other basic commodities are accurate — Kim Chong-il, who is explicitly credited with the country's economic "accomplishments," may be a natural target for opposition. In addition, the notion of dynastic socialism has attracted international reactions ranging from silence to

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ridicule (except, of course, in Romania).

The Decline of "Revolutionary Spirit"

In a sense, the younger Kim's legitimacy problems are not his fault — the succession serves as a metaphor for the generational change that is affecting North Korean society from top to bottom. There is no longer any Japanese invader to drive out, a fact the regime seems almost to regret. Younger North Koreans have no memory of the Korean war and may not share their elders' conception of the necessity of sacrifice. Kim Chong-il's chances of enforcing his inheritance will depend on his ability to convince more experienced party leaders, military officers, and bureaucrats that he can carry forward his father's work, while at the same time becoming for younger North Koreans the national totem his father has been for their parents.

This may not be easy. The Kims appear to be having a difficult time convincing North Koreans — especially younger North Koreans — to maintain collective discipline and loyalty to the dynasty. In February 1988, regime publicists lamented that some people do not possess the correct attitude toward the sacrifices required by the current "difficult circumstances" — a reference to the country's severe economic problems.[3] This editorial criticized the masses for not possessing the "spirit of revolutionary struggle," and complained that "the fighting spirit of the martyred anti-Japanese revolutionaries is a spirit which is more indomitable and stronger than that displayed in the peace days." In April, a broadcast urged the people to maintain their "revolutionary duty," defined as unquestioning loyalty to the Great Leader and the inheritance of his legacy.[4] In an unusually clear reference to discontent, people were warned to trust "no one but the party and the Leader and the revolutionary comrades with whom they are fighting together upholding the Leader." The broadcaster, in a possible message to would-be defectors, said that "if any one holds disloyal feelings to the motherland when it is in danger and tries to save his life only, no people of any

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country will regard him as one who has conscience."

It is extremely difficult to tell whether discontent has infected the North Korean élite. It seems unlikely that those officials who dislike the dynasts or who disagree with regime policies could both create an organization and escape the scrutiny of North Korea's extensive security apparatus. Nonetheless, while it is not clear which individuals disagree with specific policies or oppose the dynastic succession, the media contains fragmentary evidence that such opposition exists, perhaps focused on differences over the Kims' deepening micromanagement of the country's troubled economy. There are hints in the public media that some high-ranking cadre may have differences with the Kims, or at least that father and son suspect that a number of their immediate subordinates do not support them. For example, on July 15, 1987 *Nodong Sinmun*, the KWP daily, published a "secret" speech given exactly one year earlier to unnamed "senior" central committee members, entitled "On Some Problems of Education in the Chuche Idea." In this address, the younger Kim attacked unspecified officials who he said criticized his father's philosophy as being contrary to Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, he claimed some officials "are not firm" in regarding the leader as the center of society and its revolution and thus were guilty of defeatism. Kim Chong-il also presented a detailed exposition of his father's "Leader Theory," which makes unconditional the demand that officials be "endlessly loyal" to the succession. The bulk of his remarks stressed the importance of inculcating youth with the values his father has so carefully nurtured.

The media has continued to praise, review, and refer to this speech, marking it as one of the younger Kim's most important. Typical *Nodong Sinmun* commentaries of September 14, October 16, and October 22 warned that those who lacked the correct understanding of the relationship between the leader and society would not be considered "dutiful," and cautioned against the emergence of "factional elements." In February, as part of a letter announcing the "200-Day Battle"

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for greater production, the Politburo warned:

> "History shows that whenever the offensives of counterrevolutionary forces become intense, two utterly contradictory tenors appear. While cowards and those who are weak in their convictions betray the revolution and go down the road of surrendering to the enemy, genuine revolutionaries lead the revolution to a greater upsurge, upholding the banner of the revolution higher and countering the enemy's offensives."[5]

Five days later, Pyongyang Party boss and candidate Politburo member Kang Hui-won repeated this passage word-for-word.[6]

> "The State Theatrical Company recently performed a new version of the revolutionary drama 'Three Pretenders,' a classic masterpiece."
>
> This work is a satirical drama created and performed during the period of early revolutionary activity of the great Leader President Kim Il-song (the latter half of the 1920s). It was presented to oppose the extreme factional strife in the nationalist movement and the early communist movement in our country."
>
> "Three Pretenders,' which is based on the actions committed by the feudal rulers of Korea, shows a serious lesson that factional strife leads to an unpardonable crime against the nation."
>
> "Three ministers called Pak, Choe, and Mun serve the court of the fantastic 'Kingdom of Songdo.' While its king is alive they pretend to be unfailingly loyal to him and claim that they are pillars of the court. The foreign aggressors of the 'Kingdom of Paekma' invade their land and they ought to defend their kingdom by concerted efforts. But their king died, and they contend for the throne, not considering the fact of their kingdom..."
>
> The three ministers, each inciting his own war-

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riors, are engulfed in a fratricidal war. The army of Songdo Kingdom who was fighting the invaders of Paekma Kingdom is miserably beaten..."

"Although many years have passed since this work was Created, the drama still evokes the applause of the people. By demonstrating the lesson that factional, divisive strife recorded in the history of our country brought about the ruin of our country, the drama imbues the spectators with the essential need of unity."

Buttressing Political Structures

Kim Il-song may be attempting to arm Kim Chong-il against potential opponents by strengthening party institutions and putting the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) directly under his son's control. The party apparatus has been simply a tool in the father's all-powerful hand, but Kim Il-song seems to recognize his son will need more substantial structural support. All judgments on North Korea have to be tempered with the disclaimer that there is very little evidence to work with, but what information is available suggests Kim Chong-il's rise may have been accompanied by a decision to permit somewhat greater professional security to Central Committee members, and — maybe — to regularize promotion to candidate and full membership of that body.

Traditional Institutional Instability

North Korea's lack of experience with leadership succession has kept its ruling institutions weak. Other communist parties have adjusted to the death of charismatic founding figures (or powerful successor dictators, such as Stalin) by developing institutionalized processes for recruitment and advancement. Promotion within the élite has been measured in the progress the individual made by serving on the central committee and its bureaus, commissions, and departments. Party rules have provided meaningful guidelines for political activity. while factional alliances have been critical to profes-

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sional growth, individuals have been provided a measure of institutional protection against the whims of political opponents or even the will of the most powerful leaders.

The KWP, like most other ruling communist parties, has served to recruit talent, ensure indoctrination and popular participation in approved social activities, and enforce leadership decisions. Government, social, and religious organizations have been run by party officials, and the media have exhorted the public to defer to party leadership in all aspects of life. Party membership has been an explicit prerequisite to career advancement in all professions, and the Central Committee, in the broadest sense, had contained the country's élite. While the Central Committee has grown from 43 members in 1946 to 248 (including alternates) in 1980, it has remained much more effective than North Korea's parliament, the Supreme People's Assembly, which has ballooned to 655 members.

Traditionally, however, the Central Committee has had little structural stability, a situation corresponding to its minimal governing responsibility. Kim Il-song — perhaps looking to ensure that no one else develops a personal power base — has continually shuffled its membership, despite having long ago overcome all challenges to his rule. Of the 317 people who have served as full Central Committee members since 1946, 160 (51 percent) served once, 118 (34 percent) twice, 28 (9 percent) three times, 9 four times, and none five times. Kim Il-song and the late Kim Il served on all six Central Committees. Only at the Second Congress in 1948 and the Sixth in 1980 did a majority of full members retain their positions. Kim has never permitted members reelected from one Central Committee to make up a majority of the next one. For example, while 70 percent of the First Central Committee (elected in 1946) was reelected in 1948, that body's size was increased to the point where incumbents only comprised 45 percent of the second central Committee.

KWP instability has been further demonstrated by the lack of a regularized leadership promotion system. Historical-

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ly, very few candidate Central Committee members have been promoted to full membership at succeeding congresses. Indeed, only 24 out of the 278 candidates elected between

Korean Worker's Party Central Committee Reelection, 1946-1980.[8]

Congress	Tot.	Full Mems.	Mems.	Full Members Reelected from previous Central Committee	Full Members promoted from Candidate Ranks	Reelected Candidates
1946 First	43 (?)	43	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1948 Second	87	67	20	30 (70%)	n/a	n/a
1956 Third	116	71	45	29 (43%)	5 (25%)	2 (10%)
1961 Fourth	135	85	50	28 (39%)	12 (27%)	1 (2%)
1970 Fifth	172	117	55	31 (36%)	15 (30%)	7 (14%)
1980 Sixth	248	145	103	68 (58%)	12 (22%)	14 (25%)

1948 and 1980 have served more than once. Kim Il-song often has recruited Central Committee members from the rank and file and local bureaucracies only to reassign them subsequently to political oblivion.

Turnover has been just as high on organs of the Central Committee. Of the 43 people who have served on the Central Auditing Commission between 1946-1980, only 3 have been elected more than once. At the same time, Kim has retained 20 percent or fewer of Inspection Committee

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members at each succeeding congress.

The pattern is less clear regarding the Politburo. All five members elected in 1946 were retained two years later, almost certainly reflecting the balance among competing factions before Kim Il-song consolidated his control. Kim achieved virtually total power before the Third Congress in 1956, and six of the seven members of the 1948 Politburo were replaced. Only 3 members of the 1956 Politburo retained their positions in 1961. Nearly 3/4 of the Fourth Politburo had lost their jobs by the Party Conference in 1966 or the Fifth Party congress four years later, perhaps reflecting purges of military leaders and others in the late 1960s. Seven of 11 Politburo members were reelected in 1980, but Kim increased the size of this body to 19, diluting the incumbents' influence.

Percent of Full Central Committee Members Reelected From Previous Central Committee

(Where sources disagree – and they do more often than not – I have chosen the figure indicating the highest percentage of turnover).

Albania	USSR	China	North Korea
1986 83%	1986 45%	1987 54%	1980 58%
1981 80%	1981 75%	1985*72%	1970 36%
1976 46%	1976 87%	1982 47%	1961 39%
1971 95%	1971 69%	1977 44%	1956 43%

*Party Conference

Percent Reelected at Congresses of other Selected Parties

Bulgaria	GDR	Poland	Rumania	Mongolia	Vietnam
1981	1981	1981	1981	1981	1986
88%	87%	11%	82%	78%	56%

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Comparison with Other Communist Parties

Thus, despite the continuity of Kim Il-song's rule, KWP Central Committee membership has been less stable than that of many other communist parties.

In part, these numbers reflect the long period between KWP congresses relative to other parties' practices. But the high turnover between the Third Congress in 1956 and the Fourth in 1961 suggests time may not be a critical factor. More importantly, instances of high turnover elsewhere in the communist world have often reflected major changes in the top leadership (Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1986), massive social upheaval (Poland, 1980-1), or both (China from the Cultural Revolution right up to the present). The KWP, on the other hand, has a demonstrated record of Central Committee instability despite the fact that North Korea has not experienced such a crisis since the Korean war.

In particular, note the comparison between North Korea and Albania, another small, maverick communist state that experienced more than 40 years under the personal rule of a founding dictator, Enver Hoxha. Eighty percent of Albanian Worker's Party full Central Committee members kept their jobs at each of the last two congresses, despite the fact that this period witnessed the bloody breakup of the partnership between Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, who had been the second-ranking leader throughout much of Hoxha's tenure. This high level of institutional stability may have contributed to the relatively smooth succession of Hoxha's designated heir Ramiz Alia – who had gained nearly complete control over the party apparatus by the time Hoxha died in 1985. The institutional stability of other ruling parties relative to the KWP can also be demonstrated by measuring the regularity with which they promote candidate Central Committee members to full membership status – one measure of the predictability of professional advancement and the relative level of career security. Not only do most ruling parties tend to select more new full members from the

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candidates' ranks, but they also tend to reelect more incumbent candidates from congress to congress. The comparison of Soviet and North Korea promotion rates (promoted candidates as a percentage of all new full Central Committee members) is as follows:

USSR		North Korea	
1981	50	1980	15
1976	59	1970	17
1971	43	1961	21

East European parties also have had a more predictable promotion system. For example, 30 of the 50 new full Central Committee members elected in 1981 at the Twelfth Bulgarian Communist Party Congress had been candidate members of the previous Central Committee.

Similarly, some Asian ruling parties have had a more institutionalized promotion pattern than the KWP. At the 1986 Vietnamese Communist Party Congress – which resulted in a major leadership shakeup – 24 out of 38 new full Central Committee members (64 percent) had been candidates at the previous Congress – those 24 represented 2/3 of the 36 candidates on the previous Central Committee. Six of the other 12 retained their alternate status. Mongolian promotion rates appear lower than the Vietnamese example, but still higher than in North Korea. 30 percent of the new full members elected in 1981 had been candidates; in 1976 the figure was 44%.

Only the Chinese Communist Party appears to have had a promotion rate as small as the KWP's. Twelve percent of candidate members of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Central Committee, elected in 1977, became full members of the Twelfth Central Committee in 1982. Fourteen percent stayed on as candidates. Again, these figures result, in large part, from a social crisis greater than anything North Korea has experienced – the rehabilitation of leaders who had been purged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the demotion of those who had purged

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them, and the considerable factional infighting that followed.

Nonetheless, despite continuing policy debates, recent Chinese Communist Party promotion patterns show much greater stability than North Korea's. 72 percent of candidate members elected in 1982 were retained at the Party Conference in 1985. 27 who were promoted made up about half of the 56 new full Central committee members. At the 13th Party Congress in 1987, 22 out of 60 new full central committee members (31%) were promoted from candidate ranks.

The Sixth KWP Congress and Institutional Stability

Kim Il-song's tendency to make sweeping personnel changes and the lack of information about North Korea makes one cautious in making judgments about political trends in Pyongyang. Nonetheless, turnover rates at the Sixth Party Congress and after suggest the possibility that Kim Il-song has become somewhat more willing than in the past to permit Central Committee members some degree of job stability. This trend – if it persists – could reflect a decision to strengthen the supporting political structures Kim Chong-il will need after his father dies.

Central Committee turnover has slowed down, at least temporarily. As shown in the graphic analyzing changes in the Central Committees between 1966-1980, fifty-eight percent of full members of the Fifth Central Committee were reelected in 1980, reversing the trend toward progressively lower retention rates evident since 1956. Incumbents made up 47 percent of full Central Committee members – the highest proportion in KWP history. In addition, while the rate of promotion from candidate to full member remained low, 25 percent of candidate members of the fifth Central Committee kept their jobs in 1980, another historic high. In addition, Kim Il-song doubled the number of candidate members – another unprecedented development – perhaps to provide a greater pool for future promotion.

It is extremely difficult to determine the stability of the

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Central Committee since 1980 — North Korea rarely publishes the names of demoted Central Committee members — but the list of those elected to the Supreme People's Assembly in 1986 suggests most members have retained their seats. In addition, developments at two of the last three plenums (February and December 1986, March 1988) indicate a continued trend toward greater institutional stability. According to North Korean media, 8 of the 13 full members elected in February were incumbent candidates — an extremely high percentage in North Korean terms. Similarly, nine of the eleven new Central Committee members elected in March 1988 came from Candidate ranks. No information is available about Central Committee changes in December 1986.

Obviously, it will take the results of at least one more party congress to determine the validity of the hypothesis that the KWP Central Committee is stabilizing its membership and promotion policies. Even then, the evidence could be ambiguous. The Kims could promote new full members from the ranks of the increasing pool of candidates — further regularizing promotion policy — while dropping many incumbent full members. Even granting the difficulty in analyzing North Korea's unpredictable political culture, however, loyalty to the dynasty as the succession approaches almost certainly will be affected by the stake each official thinks he or she has in political continuity near the top. Structural effectiveness, in addition, may depend on whether functionaries are permitted enough experience in their jobs to perform effectively.

Kim Chong-il's Team

It is difficult to determine exactly which Central Committee and Politburo members are close associates of Kim Chong-il, as opposed to those who are "merely" technocrats and party apparatchiks, or who are more closely associated with his father. In one sense, this is not a yet a critical matter. There is no evidence the Kims — like 18th Century

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European kings and crown princes – are the centerpieces of rival courts struggling for wealth and authority. To all appearances, father and son are mutually loyal. In the longer run, however, the passing of power will be accompanied by wholesale generational change in the élite, and it is not too soon to seek out likely players in the transition.

But how does one do this? The simplest way would be to assume that younger officials are closer to the son while the members of the old guard owe their positions to the father. Some older officials, such as Chief of Staff Ch'oe Kwang, Vice-Presidents Pak Song-ch'ol and Yi Chong-ok, and Defense Minister O Chin-u, served as wartime comrades to Kim Il-song, and presumably remain within his inner circle. Likewise, some younger officials are rumored to have been schoolmates of Kim Chong-il. There certainly is merit to this approach, but will not older leaders seek to strengthen their ties to Kim Chong-il in order to retain influence after his father's passing? In addition, Kim Il-song traditionally has promoted the sons and daughters of wartime comrades, and some newer leaders may thus owe more to the father than the son.

In fact, the children of revolutionary heroes probably maintain strong ties to both father and son because they benefit from the dynastic model as much as the Kims. Politburo member and former Premier Kang Song-San, former Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol, and other officials almost certainly owe their prestige and privileges to their fathers' revolutionary exploits.[9] To put the problem somewhat differently, we can assume that all officials promoted since Kim Chong-il rose to prominence owe allegiance to him. It is clear that certain leaders have risen only in recent years, and are good analytical candidates for the younger Kim's team. Politburo member and former Foreign Minister Ho Tam, for example, rose from the 29th-ranking official on the Fifth Central Committee to 18th at the Sixth Congress, and is now placed ninth or tenth in the leadership. He is also related to the Kim family by marriage, a fact that certainly

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does not harm his career prospects.

Others have risen even more spectacularly. Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam sat 80th in 1970, but joined the Politburo at the Sixth Party Congress and now ranks perhaps 12th. Yon Hyong-muk, a Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary who has recently become Premier, was listed only 63rd in 1970, rose to 19th ten years later, and currently appears to be about even with Ho Tam. Kye Ug-tae, who was promoted from candidate to full membership on the Politburo in February, ranked 73rd in 1970 and 16th in 1980. So Yun-sok, currently KWP boss in South Pyongan Province — a relatively industrialized area near Pyongyang — earned only last place among the 55 Central Committee alternates (172nd overall) in 1970, but was placed 29th at the Sixth Party Congress, and currently is one of 14 full Politburo members. Former Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol rose from 109th in 1970 to 13th — and Politburo full membership — ten years later. Others whose stars appear to be attached to Kim Chong-il's include Premier Yi Kun-mo, Vice-Premier and candidate Politburo member Chong Chun-ki, Kang Hui-won — another candidate Politburo member and the mayor of Pyongyang — and Kim Si-hak, a KWP Department Deputy Director.

It also seems useful to note which leaders tend to appear with Kim Chong-il on his rare public appearances (in 1987 Kim Il-song made over 110 public appearances, Kim Chong-il just 14). We can learn more from the younger Kim's appearances without his father than when father and son show up together (as they did 8 times in 1987). Virtually the entire leadership turns out when both Kims do, while a more selective coterie sometimes accompanies Kim Chong-il when his father is not present. Even granting that certain functions automatically call for specific functionaries, these frequencies are probably worth our attention.

Ho Tam and Yon Hyong-muk again stand out using this method of analysis. Each was present at more than 30 appearances Kim Chong-il made without his father between

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1980 and the middle of 1988. The only official appearing as often on such occasions was Defense Minister O Chin-u, whose loyalty to the son may be as strong as to the father. In the same period, So Yun-sok appeared with Kim Chong-il over 20 times, Kim Yong-nam 9 times and O Kuk-yol 8. Kim Chung-nin, a former Politburo member demoted after North Korean agents attempted to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon in October 1983, showed up with the son 11 times. Kim Chung-nin enjoyed a minor rehabilitation in 1987, when he was appointed to head KCNA, the North Korean news agency.

The Military

There is little evidence to support occasional Western and Japanese press speculation that military leaders disapprove of the dynastic succession, or that they are strong enough to prevent the son from initially taking his father's place. There are fragmentary indications in the media, however, that some officers believe the Kims' policies are detrimental to military readiness. If accurate, this information suggests a longer-run danger to the dynasty.

The political views of military leaders could become crucial in North Korea after Kim Il-song dies. In some respects, the Korean People's Army may play a role in mass socialization as important as the KWP. Virtually all North Korean men (and most women) serve a stint in the armed forces, where they ingest daily regime propaganda blasts that warn of the imminence of a war that will engulf the peninsula and develop into a global thermonuclear holocaust.

Kim Il-song, fully aware that the military's socializing function could lead to "Bonapartism," has not been shy about replacing his military chiefs. For example, in the late 1960s he purged a number of leading generals — including Chief of Staff Ch'oe Kwang — perhaps reflecting a North Korean version of the "red" vs. "expert" debate over the relative importance of equipment modernization and revolutionary spirit. Recent personnel shifts suggest Kim retains control

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over his generals, although the changes may also indicate that some officers disagree with Kim's priorities. The political status of the military has been reduced since the Sixth KWP Congress. Of the 8 officers elected to the Politburo in 1980, only Defense Minister O Chin-u remains in place – 2 have died and 5 have been demoted without being replaced. Most importantly, Chief of Staff O Kuk-yol was sacked sometime before February 21, when Ch'oe Kwang – his replacement – participated in an airport sendoff for O Chin-u's trip to Moscow.

The reemergence of Ch'oe, who is a candidate Politburo member and has held a number of jobs since the 1960s, could indicate that the "expert" side is winning the ideological battle over military policy. Alternatively, Kim Il-song may have decided to reappoint older men who are well-respected within the military as veterans of the anti-Japanese struggle and the Korean War. Chon Mun-sop, a demoted Politburo member, former Minister of Public Security, and another member of the old guard, made his first public appearance since 1986 at the February send-off for O Chin-u. In May, Chon was publicly identified as a Deputy Defense Minister.

The generational explanation would fit in with the possibility – admittedly speculative – of military dissatisfaction with the regime's penchant for diverting thousands of soldiers for employment on civilian construction projects. The press is full of praise for "soldier-builders" by the Kims and by generals apparently charged with convincing officers and troops of the value of the projects that take up so much of their time.

Troops have traditionally been seconded to civilian needs, but Pyongyang's recent claims are unprecedented. In 1986 the regime announced a decision to withdraw 150,000 troops from the front lines for use on civilian projects, and in 1987 it reportedly discharged 100,000 soldiers for the same purpose as part of its offer to reduce forces on both sides of the DMZ to 100,000 men by 1992. While these initiatives were undertaken in the context of the North's effort to seize

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the diplomatic high ground in North-South dialogue, they probably reflected a real need to improve economic performance. Besides their use on construction projects, soldiers appear to be lending their usual hand in rural areas during planting and harvest times.

The public media have carried nuanced, fragmentary hints of military concern over the effect on military readiness of these assignments and the Great Leader's general approach to North-South issues. For example, on December 27, 1984 — after North and South Korean officials had embarked on the latest round of their occasional dialogue — a *Nodong Sinmun* article warned against neglecting military modernization for the sake of seeking peace with implacable adversaries. The author, a deputy editor, used an historical analogy rather than any contemporary theme, but the message was clear (by North Korean standards, at least).

On August 10, 1987, an article reported the celebration of the 40th anniversary of a wartime meeting between Kim and his generals.[10] The author quoted Kim as having stressed the "critical" importance of maintaining a strong military force. It followed by a few days North Korea's public pledge to discharge 100,000 troops and may have been a veiled criticism of that policy.

Economic Problems and the Succession

Whether or not officers dislike using troops as construction workers, the military's growing civilian responsibilities reflect an overall — and perhaps accelerating — deterioration in North Korea's economic performance. Kim Chong-il, acclaimed publicly as the architect of Pyongyang's economic policies, almost certainly is tarnished by the country's economic problems.

It is unclear just how bad things are, but persistent press reports of shortages of food and other basic commodities may reflect a significant worsening of the standard of living in the past few years. Sin Sang-ok and Choe Un-hui, a movie director and actress who fled the North in February 1986

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after working closely with Kim Chong-il, have written memoirs describing the disparities between life at the top and the difficulties suffered by ordinary North Koreans. Similarly, members of the Kim Man-chol family, who defected in early 1987, have told reporters of severe food and clothing supply problems.

The Soviets, among others, have commented on the North's economic shortcomings. A *Pravda* correspondent, writing after a visit to North Korea in 1987, mentioned "certain difficulties and complex problems" which persist in agriculture. He noted that the grain problem "still has not been fully resolved."[11] In December, *Izvestiya* noted that the North is fulfilling its food program "only with difficulty," and presented its readers with the picture of a drab Pyongyang where streets are empty and shops are bare."[12] This article also criticized the North's inefficient transportation system and contrasted North Korea's spartan conditions with the "impressive" economic development in South Korea. Recent meetings between Soviet and North Korean officials have resulted in "exchanges of view" over bilateral economic relations and Soviet complaints that the North does not meet its contractual obligations.

Even North Korean media have complained about economic difficulties. In July 1987, a *Nodong Sinmun* editorial spoke of the "strained state" of railroad transportation[13] and expressed concern that the benefits of production increases could be negated by an inability to ship goods to market. In January 1988, a broadcast stressed that the economy "Cannot be developed at a high speed" unless greater efforts are put into the power, coal, and metallurgical industries.[14]

Kim Il-song himself told a group of visiting Japanese journalists that his country's economic development was slow.[15] His 1988 New Year's address was somber compared to the year before, again with a marked stress on the necessity of solving problems in the power, coal, and metallurgical industries. According to the Great Leader, "the tasks facing us this year are enormous."[16]

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In February, the regime demonstrated its impatience with economic performance by declaring a "200-Day Battle" designed to accelerate production in all sectors before the North celebrates its 70th anniversary on September 9. Pyongyang Party boss Kang Hui-won gave a harsh appraisal of the economy before a mass meeting in support of the "battle."[17] He declared that "the internal and external situation of our revolution is more complicated and strained than ever before," demanded that North Koreans turn "adverse circumstances into favorable circumstances," and declared that many "difficulties and ordeals may block the future." He repeated the Great Leader's warning against "cowards." The North's economic problems are also indicated by the delay in meeting the goals of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) and by the unauspicious beginning to the Third Plan, scheduled to run from 1987-1993. The old Plan was stretched until 1986, when officials announced its goals had been achieved. In 1987, when the new Plan was launched at a meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly, the regime announced new production targets that in some cases did not call for improvement over earlier plans. In fact, some of the new goals indicate North Korea is having trouble achieving the ten priority objectives for the current decade set in 1980. Kim Il-song, in his New Year's address, referred twice to the necessity of reaching the old milestones.

Production Targets[18]

	1980	*Third Seven-Year Plan*
Steel Production	15 Million Tons	10 Million Tons
Coal Production	120 Million Tons	120 Million Tons
Electric Power	100 Billion KHW	100 Billion KWH.
Non-Ferrous Metals	1.5 Million Tons	1.7 Million Tons
Cement	20 Million Tons	22 Million Tons
Grain	15 Million Tons	15 Million Tons*
Seafood	5 Million Tons	11 Million Tons
Textile Products	1.5 Billion Meters	1.5 Billion Meters

* Including 7 million tons of rice.

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Production shortcomings have led to some academic speculation that Kim Chong-il intends to reform the economy, perhaps by borrowing the lessons of recent changes in Soviet and Chinese economic policies. There is no evidence this is the case, or that he is willing to relinquish personal control in order to permit lower-level officials (much less the "market") to make economic decisions. The North is trying to attract capital and technology from abroad, but there is no sign the Kims will relinquish their direct control over absorbing and distributing these acquisitions. Public statements that the Great and Dear Leaders maintain control over all decision-making probably should be taken at face value.

Indeed, North Korea so far seems to be relying on traditional central planning methods to increase production, and actively rejecting the economic strategies pursued in Moscow and Beijing. The Kims' response to economic problems has been to employ masses of corvee labor to squeeze out greater quantities of goods, and to reject material incentives in favor of ideological encouragement as a motivator. Kim Chong-il occasionally sends out "Three Revolutions Teams" – Agitprop groups associated with him since the 1970s – to inspire greater performance.

And, in North Korea, economic performance is a classic Stalinist concept, stressing the need for production of basic commodities for use in grandiose construction projects controlled to the last detail from the "Party Center." In July 1987, *Nodong Sinmun* defended the regime's insistence on large projects, and ordered "all sectors" to supply materials and facilities "preferentially and in a timely manner."[19] Kim Il-song, in his New Year's address, explicitly made these monumental projects a top priority, placing them ahead of the necessity of improving agricultural performance and North Korea's standard of living.

Resources have been marshalled for huge iron works, electric power generating plants, and synthetic textile mills. In particular, Kim Chong-il has associated himself with the

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construction of the mammoth "Kwangbok Street" sports complex located between the capital and Kim Il-song's birthplace at Mangyongdae. This enormous project,[20] in part connected with the North's failed effort to cohost the Olympic Games, is typical of the regime's penchant for costly monuments that seem to have little value other than to further the most extensive personality cult in the communist world.

Kwangbok Street and other projects seem to have strained the North's labor supply. Even the military may no longer be able to satisfy the Kims' insatiable appetite for enormous construction efforts. Last December, Pyongyang radio spoke of the need to "find out reserves for increased production and saving.[21]

Kim Tal-hyon, at the time about to take over the State Planning Commission, implied in the February 1988 issue of *Kulloja*, the KWP theoretical journal, that some North Koreans doubt the value of the priority construction projects.[22] Kim defended the expenditure of resources on a huge nitrogen fertilizer and synthetic fiber complex, which he said will help alleviate food and clothing supply problems. He urged citizens to accept Kim Il-song's instructions on this topic as a "joy and honor," rather than a mere "obligation."

Agriculture may be the sector most distorted by the Kims' single-minded concentration on huge building projects. If reports (largely in the Japanese press) of food shortages are accurate, farming in North Korea is even more troubled than in other planned economies. North Korean publicists have often spoken of difficulties in agriculture, a theme repeated by Kim Il-song in his New Year's address.

Agriculture in North Korea is thoroughly collectivized and centrally controlled. Farmers are permitted to keep enough food for their own subsistence, but virtually everything else is owned and distributed by the state. Kim Il-song's "Rural Thesis" is another Stalinist relic, under which farmers are organized to solve the "...Rural Problem, the work of removing the ideological, technological, and cultural

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backwardness of the rural community as compared with the urban community."[23]

Falling Behind the South

The North's economic problems are especially noteworthy in the wake of South Korea's economic gains, and in view of the growth in Seoul's cultural and trading contacts with the Soviet Union and China. Western and Japanese press sources commonly allege that Sino-South Korean trade now exceeds that between China and North Korea. The communist world's attendance at the Olympic Games and the Soviet bloc's publicly-acknowledged exchange of trade offices with the South symbolize North Korea's increasing international isolation. Meanwhile, the North's poor credit rating and its failure to attract significant levels of foreign capital and technology deepen its isolation, further encouraging its allies to increase bilateral ties with the South.

In his 1988 New Year's Address, Kim demonstrated sensitivity to the comparison between North and South Korean economic development. According to the "Great Leader,"

> "Carrying out this year's tasks successfully is not only important in hastening the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the republic, but will greatly inspire the fighting South Korean people and clearly show the validity and vitality of the *chuche* idea..."

Outlook

Kim Il-song, still vital and active at 76, will likely retain power as long as he is physically able to exercise it. In the meantime, Kim Chong-il has accumulated virtually all the levers he should need for a successful initial dynastic succession. In addition, the KWP may be developing institutional structures strong enough to help him manage initially without his father's unique presence.

Whether he will long survive Kim Il-song's passing will

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depend, in part, on the younger Kim's as yet untested political skills, as well as on the long term loyalty of officials who currently have no choice but to demonstrate their obedience. Kim Chong-il's ability to act like a leader, and to inherit the probably sincere reverence accorded his father will be as important in North Korea as in other countries where such transitions have taken place. To succeed he may have to be like "Baby Doc" Duvalier, making up for a lack of charisma by skillful manipulation of political institutions and traditional symbolism of North Korea and the ruthless use of the pervasive security services.

The Political Dilemma of Economic Reform

But – assuming he survives the initial transition period – it is economic performance that will probably make or break Kim Chong-il. The Kims' recent attempt to strengthen KWP political structures could founder if the North cannot find a way to deal with its chronic economic stagnation.

Political problems inherent in the concept of reform may prevent the younger Kim from making necessary changes in the North's economic system after his father passes from the scene (assuming Kim Chong-il even wants to make such reforms). If the younger Kim decides to permit limited experiments with market-pricing and to allow local managers to make production decisions – or even to close unprofitable enterprises – he will gain the support of economic technocrats and those party officials inclined toward modernization. But Kim Chong-il would then have to surrender some of the personal controls his father spent a lifetime building, and could face opposition from those bureaucrats and economic planners whose influence depends on the current Stalinist system.

In short, reform would present Kim Chong-il with problems similar to those faced by Mikhail Gorbachev, but Kim would not possess the established institutional weapons Gorbachev can wield against opponents and foot-draggers. Of course, the Dear Leader could arrest everyone who lacks

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enthusiasm for reform, but that strategy would displace most of North Korea's most experienced managers and likely make economic matters worse.

If he stands pat, however, Kim Chong-il will have no way of dealing with economic decline or stemming the growing economic and, perhaps, political disparity with the South. Under these circumstances, once his father is gone, the younger Kim could face social unrest unlike any the North has experienced since the Korean war.

Comparison with the South

Internal developments in both Koreas — by gradually increasing South Korean self-confidence at the same time the North begins to suffer self-doubts — may be changing the peninsular correlation of forces. The North traditionally has believed itself the stronger political Korea; the South, in the past, has agreed. North Korea has supported — and South Korea has opposed — proposals for a Korean confederation in which the two systems would be permitted their separate development, implying that both Koreas have assumed the North would absorb the South.

On the surface, South Korea's ongoing political turmoil would seem to reinforce that perception. But the South's shaky present may be laying the groundwork for stronger political and social institutions if — big ifs —

— political parties can learn to accept rotation of power and the concept of a loyal opposition,

— labor unions grow that protect workers' economic interests while remaining committed to a democratic framework, and

— student activists can articulate positive demands for reform, rather than simple calls for the system's destruction.

This scenario, of course, also assumes that South Korea's export- driven boom continues and fuels an overall maturation of the domestic economy.

If this fragile conception holds together, South Korea's

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self-confidence may grow, perhaps leading to a more forthcoming approach to North-South dialogue. The North, meanwhile, may find its political capital dwindling as its economic situation deteriorates.

Postscript: The Worst Case

The foregoing analysis, and the North Koreans themselves, assume the leader will die before his designated successor. As in other communist countries, this is not necessarily the case. The fall of Lin Biao and the death of Chou Enlai both preceded Mao's passing and contributed to the ongoing, continuing period of political uncertainty in China. The death of Edvard Kardelj in 1979 removed Tito's logical successor (although it seems unlikely Kardelj could have prevented the political drift, economic distress and ethnic strains that continue to plague Yugoslavia).

North Korea will be even more severely affected than China or Yugoslavia if the heir dies or disappears before the ruler leaves the scene. The elder Kim has spent well over a decade preparing his son for power, and probably would not have as much time to develop an alternative vessel in which to store his political immortality. Therefore, since there apparently is no alternative to Kim Chong-il, the father needs the son as much as *vice versa*.

This material has been reviewed by the CIA to assist the author in removing classified information, if any. However, that review neither constitutes CIA authentification of material as factual nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.

FOOTNOTES

1. I recommend the interested reader consult Norman Jacobs' excellent study The Korean Road to Modernization and Development (University of Illinois Press, 1985). Professor Jacobs analyzes South Korean society, but many of his inciteful observations apply to the North as well.
2. See Morgan E. Clippinger, "Kim Chong-il in the North Korean Mass Media: A Study of Semi-Esoteric communication," *Asian Survey*, XXI, 3, March 1981, pp. 289-309.
3. See *Nodong Sinmun*, "Let Us Brilliantly Inherit the Revolutionary Spirit

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Highly displayed in the Forests of Mt. Paektu," February 1, 1988.
4. Pyongyang Domestic Service, April 13, 1988.
5. Pyongyang Domestic Service, February 21, 1988.
6. Pyongyang Domestic Service, February 26, 1988.
7. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 1987, pp. 24-5
8. Suh Dae-suk, Korean Communism, 1946-1980 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981).
9. See Suh Dae-suk, "Political Succession and Changes in the North Korean Policy Toward South Korea," *Korea Observer* (Institute of Korean Studies, Seoul), XIX, 1, Spring 1988, pp. 32-33.
10. KCNA, August 10, 1987
11. *Pravda*, October 7, 1987.
12. *Izvestiya*, December 27, 1987
13. *Nodong Sinmun*, July 21, 1987.
14. *Pyongyang Domestic Service*, January 16, 1988.
15. *Asahi Shimbun*, June 2, 1987.
16. *KCNA*, January 1, 1988.
17. *Pyongyang Domestic Service*, February 26, 1988.
18. Sources: *KCNA*, October 20, 1980 and April 21, 1987.
19. *Nodong Sinmun*, July 27, 1987.
20. In April, 1987 *Xinhua* quoted a North Korean official as saying that Kwangbok Street involved the labor of 900,000 construction workers, making it the largest project in the country's history.
21. Pyongyang Domestic Service, December 20, 1987.
22. Kim Tal-hyon, "Decisive Factor That Must Be Adhered To in Resolving the Problems of Food, Clothing, and Shelter At Present," *Kulloja*, February, 1988, pp. 63-67.
23. *Pyongyang Domestic Service*, October 22, 1987.

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DECENTRALIZING PUBLIC SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Introduction

In most developing countries, the provision, financing and maintenance of public services and infrastructure play a crucial role in national development and account for a substantial portion of the expenditures in national budgets. Increasingly, however, the ability of central government ministries, agencies and enterprises to provide public services and infrastructure efficiently and effectively is being questioned. Both international assistance organizations and governments in developing countries are searching for alternative means of providing public services in order to relieve the growing financial burdens on central treasuries and to reduce high levels of public employment (World Bank, 1988b).

Problems of Central Government Planning and Management

Decentralizing administrative and financial responsibilities for public services and infrastructure is one possible means of accomplishing those objectives. The growing interest in decentralization arises from the realization that in many countries services are provided by central governments inefficiently and ineffectively, and that local governments, private enterprises and nongovernmental organizations can play a stronger role.

Among the criticisms of central governments' performance

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in providing public services are the following (Tendler, 1979; Rondinelli and Mandell, 1981: Ayubi, 1982):

First, most central governments are primarily concerned with the management of macro-economic policies and with maintaining national political stability. They are usually far less concerned with the efficient provision of public services except to the extent that it involves large-scale, capital-intensive investments.

Second, rarely do internal incentive systems exist for officials in central government ministries to perceive citizens as their clientele and consequently they do not define their major functions as satisfying citizens' needs and demands. Public service ministries are often unresponsive to citizens' needs.

Third, central ministries are usually staffed with technicians and professionals who are concerned with the more glamorous and professionally satisfying tasks of constructing large-scale, capital intensive projects rather than with the more routine aspects of service delivery and maintenance.

Central government agencies are notoriously ineffective in maintaining infrastructure after it is constructed. The World Bank (1988a) reports, for example, that about 30 percent of the nonurban roads in developing countries receiving Bank assistance need reconstruction because of poor maintenance, and that 40 percent require immediate maintenance if they are to be usable over the next ten years. The cost of reconstruction and maintenance is estimated at more than $90 billion.

Fourth, central ministries often provide network-based services, facilities and infrastructure that are more elaborate and technologically advanced than consumers need, and tend to choose new and modern technologies that are expensive to maintain rather than adapting indigenous or traditional ones that can be maintained locally.

Fifth, weak administrative capacity at the national level in many developing countries also limits central government's ability to deliver public services efficiently, even if larger

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amounts of financial resources were available. Among the most serious administrative problems are overcentralization of planning and decision-making in national ministries, weak planning and managerial capability at all levels of administration, difficulties in coordinating service delivery among national ministries and between central government agencies and local governments, ineffective managerial and supervisory practices in the field, and severe shortages of trained personnel and professionals.

Sixth, nearly everywhere, public services and infrastructure provided by central governments are perceived by citizens as "free" public goods to which they are entitled, rather than as resources that should be provided locally, or for which they should pay. Thus, user charges and other forms of payment for these services are unpopular, hard to enforce and easy to relax when the central government treasury subsidizes the cost.

Seventh, regardless of their effectiveness in providing public services, both heavy borrowing during the 1970s and the economic recessions of the early 1980s left central governments in many developing countries with little capital for investing in new infrastructure or for expanding social services. In the decade and a half from 1970 to 1986, the indebtedness of developing countries increased from $49 billion to almost $775 billion. Debt service as a percentage of GNP increased from 1.5 to 4.4, and as a percentage of exports from 10 to 20 percent (World Bank, 1988b). The world economic recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s also played an important role in increasing the interest of governments in decentralizing the finance and management of public services.

Finally, the dominance of central governments in service provision has greatly weakened the capacity of local governments to raise adequate revenues to provide public services and infrastructure through their own budgets. National governments in most developing countries have appropriated to themselves the most lucrative sources of public revenue,

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leaving local governments only with those taxes and fees that yield the least revenues or that are the most difficult to collect. Moreover, the legal status of local governments as agents of the central government, with little authority or taxing ability of their own, has left them highly dependent on central government financial transfers and grants-in-aid.

In brief, the dominant role of central government agencies in public service and infrastructure provision, the rising costs of providing adequate services and effective maintenance, and tight financial constraints imposed by debt-repayment and structural adjustment policies have all combined in recent years to restrict severely the ability of central governments in most developing countries to meet growing needs for the public services and infrastructure that are essential to expanded production, economic growth and poverty alleviation.

With the growing concern over national debt crises and the pressures of structural adjustment policies to curtail total public sector obligations, the role of the central government in providing public services — and even of the system of central government transfers to local authorities — have come under closer scrutiny. In several countries pursuing decentralization programs, such as Thailand, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia and Nepal, the central government's main motivation has been to reduce the financial burden on the central treasury. Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia and Nigeria — all faced with declining oil revenues — are attempting to reduce the financial obligations of the central government to provide services and to reduce public employment.

Central government transfers are being used increasingly to induce local governments to raise more resources for themselves and to control local expenditures more carefully. This approach has been used in the Calcutta region of India and is now being introduced in Nepal. Both national and municipal governments are beginning to use the private sector to deliver public services by contracting out some parts of service provision or tax collection, or by privatizing entire

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service agencies (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1988).

Improving economic and financial management by decentralizing responsibilities for the financing, provision and maintenance of public services and infrastructure requires a careful assessment of appropriate organizational and financial arrangements for different types of public services and facilities in different countries. Such an assessment must begin with analysis of the characteristics of public services, of different groups of service users, and of the organizational arrangements for service delivery.

Organizational Arrangements for Decentralization

Decentralization can be defined as "the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations" (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986: 5).

There are four major forms of decentralization – deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization or deregulation – each with different characteristics.

Deconcentration, which is often considered the weakest form of decentralization, is the redistribution of decision-making authority and financial and management responsibilities for providing public services and infrastructure among different levels *within the central government*. It can merely take the form of shifting work from central government officials in the capital city to those working in regions, provinces or districts. But deconcentration also occurs when central ministries create new field offices to extend or carry out their work at the local level, or when national governments create local units of administration. Deconcentration is usually the first cautious step toward decentralization that highly centralized governments take.

Some degree of decentralization has been achieved even

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in highly centralized governments by deconcentrating management structure through field administration. As opposed to merely shifting workload from central government offices in the capital city to those in other locations, creation of a system discretion to field staff, allowing them some latitude to plan, make routine decisions and adjust the implementation of central directives to local conditions, within guidelines set by the central ministries. Under a system of field administration, even though government officers are working within local jurisdictions that may have semi-autonomous or delegated powers, field staff are employees of a central ministry and remain under its direction and control.

The degree of decentralization that is achieved by deconcentration depends on a number of variables. Experience suggests that a greater degree of decentralization is achieved by deconcentration when 1) there are more levels in the hierarchy of the agency or ministry in which deconcentration occurs; 2) larger numbers of responsibilities are assigned to field officers or local representatives; 3) mechanisms of coordination over the activities of field personnel are not controlled by a single unit or director; 4) field officers are not required to refer most matters to central headquarters for decision; 5) personnel are rotated between headquarters and local units of administration; 6) field officials are heavily involved in policy and program planning and providing information and advice to headquarters; and, 7) monitoring and control depend more on reporting than inspection or advance review (Smith, 1967).

In situations where deconcentration gives field officers or local officials little discretion in decision-making, little autonomous responsibility for performing their functions and little control over resources, it may result merely in shifting workload. On the other hand, in highly centralized governments, deconcentration can be a means of improving the efficiency and responsiveness of central government agencies.

Delegation is a somewhat more extensive form of

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decentralization. Through delegation, central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, but ultimately accountable to it. Governments delegate responsibilities when they create public enterprises or corporations, housing authorities, transportation authorities, special service districts, regional development corporations, or special project implementation units. Usually these organizations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making. They may be exempt from constraints on regular civil service personnel. They may be able to charge for their services and may be operated like private corporations, using business practices and procedures.

The response of many Third World governments to the severe limitations on public administration capability and financial resources has been to delegate more functions to public corporations and special authorities, which are considered to be "off-budget" administrative units.

Governments in developing countries have created state-owned enterprises or public corporations to provide public services and facilities for a variety of reasons: to control natural monopolies, to ensure adequate service provision by central bureaucracies; to assure national control over a politically important basic service; and to provide a mechanism for expanding services requiring large "lumpy" capital investments (Shirley, 1983).

In countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, however, the provision of public services through state-owned enterprises and special authorities has not always been efficient nor have the public corporations been financially self-sustaining (Pakkesem, 1985; Al-Haj and Yusof, 1985). Poor performance in these and other countries has led to a serious reassessment of their operations, additional controls on their financial transactions, and recommendations for divestiture or sale to the private sector.

Devolution is a third type of administrative decentralization. When governments devolve functions, they transfer

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authority for decision-making, finance and management to local governments with corporate status. Devolution involves transferring responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make investment decisions. These characteristics distinguish local government from local administration.

There are strong potential advantages of decentralizing responsibilities for financing and managing many public services to local governments. Local government officials can often plan investments in services and infrastructure in a more responsive manner because they have greater knowledge of local conditions and needs; they can more efficiently maintain services and infrastructure because they can monitor disruptions, breakdowns or deterioration: they can provide closer supervision of service delivery; and they can more easily create the enabling conditions necessary for private and nongovernmental organizations to participate in service provision.

But in most developing countries, local governments are among the weakest administrative units and few have the financial resources to fulfill their potential. Many local governments in Asian and African countries lack the skilled personnel to plan and manage service delivery efficiently or to expand the local revenue base. Most municipalities in Latin America are plagued with inefficient organizational structures and operating procedures, and lack clear legal authority to deal effectively with many local problems (DeMello, 1982). Moreover, many local governments do not have jurisdictions that are geographically large enough to provide some services economically and efficiently.

Finally, *privatization* is the most extensive form of decentralization. Privatization is usually, but not always, accompanied by economic liberalization policies and deregulation of market operations. Privatization encourages or allows services to be provided by businesses, community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary associations,

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individuals, small enterprises in the informal sector, and other nongovernmental organizations. Goods and services that can be provided on the basis of people's ability to pay – such as public transportation, electric power, piped water, or housing – can often be delivered more efficiently and effectively by the private sector than by government (Roth, 1987).

Privatization can range in scope from leaving the provision of goods and services entirely to market competition, to partnerships between public agencies and private enterprises. Privatization can take a number of forms such as allowing private sector enterprises to provide services and facilities that had previously been monopolized by the public sector; contracting out the management of public services or facilities; financing public sector programs through the capital market and allowing private organizations to participate; joint ventures between public and private organizations or turnkey projects, in which governments agree to buy or lease completed facilities constructed by private enterprises.

Advocates of privatizing the provision of goods and services that had previously been provided by government argue that private sector organizations have such advantages as lower production costs, greater efficiency in service delivery and greater capacity to obtain and maintain capital equipment. They contend that the private sector can offer consumers greater choice and provide services more flexibly. Private organizations can make decisions more efficiently and expeditiously than government agencies. When they deliver public services effectively, private organizations reduce the financial and employment burdens on government (Hatry, 1983: Pirie, 1985).

Many of those who are critical of – or at least cautious about – privatization see problems with expanding private sector participation in public service provision (Hatry, 1983; Pirie, 1985). Privatization, they argue can lead to unemployment for public employees, raise the price of public services

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and infrastructure for many consumers, and provide greater opportunities for corruption. Those employed by private firms may receive lower wages and less employment security than public employees doing similar jobs. There is a danger that private businesses will reduce or eliminate basic social services that are unprofitable, or exclude those who cannot afford to pay market prices from receiving them. Moreover, privatization can reduce public control over the types and quality of services available. It can convert public monopolies into private monopolies and give greater economic and political influence to big businesses. Privatization can also lead to greater adverse externalities and social costs (Savas, 1982; Hatry, 1983; DeHoog, 1987).

Our ability to assess the degree to which these potential advantages and disadvantages affect the decentralization of different types of services is limited, however, by a paucity of comparative research on these organizational alternatives and on their economic and financial impacts in developing countries.

Regardless of which organizational alternatives are chosen, those assessing the feasibility of decentralization as a means of improving economic and financial management must also consider alternative financial arrangements. Different means of financing the services provided through local governments and private organizations also have potential advantages and disadvantages.

Alternatives for Financing Decentralization

Financial responsibility is at the core of the concept of decentralization. Without the transfer of adequate financial resources or authority to raise financial resources, administrative decentralization is meaningless.

There is a wide range of sources available at the local level and in the private sector in many developing countries for financing public services and infrastructure, without relying only on central government funds. Analysis of these financing arrangements must be concerned with three

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questions: who pays, how the payment amount is determined, and what form the payment should take.

There are seven major financial arrangements for decentralizing public services and infrastructure that policy analysts should consider:

Self-financing and cost recovery can be achieved directly through user charges, and indirectly in urban areas through betterment levies and land readjustment programs. User charges can be levied for those services or infrastructure for which there are direct relationships among the costs of providing the services, the amount charged for the services, and the amount of services received. Betterment levies, which have been used extensively in Colombia, India and Indonesia, are taxes on landowners for those services for which there is some direct relationship between providing the service and improvements in the value of property owned by the beneficiaries (Bird, 1984; Misra, 1986). The costs of providing services are recovered by taxing surplus value created by public improvements on or near private property. Land readjustment programs – whereby land owners pool their property for service improvements and contribute a sufficient amount of land to compensate government for the cost of services and infrastructure – have been used effectively in Korea, Taiwan and Thailand to recover the costs of servicing land that is likely to be developed in the near future (Doebele, 1979; Archer, 1987).

When they are applied effectively, user charges encourage fiscal discipline among both service providers and service users. The World Bank (1988b) reports that in a survey of 25 countries user charges accounted for nearly one-third of all locally raised revenue. One advantage of user charges is their flexibility; they can be adjusted as costs change over time. Also, charges can be set at the appropriate level to cover both service delivery and facilities maintenance, thereby encouraging better care of infrastructure and equipment.

There are also some disadvantages to user charges. They are often difficult to levy for services considered to be

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essential for the public welfare or that are "indivisible," such as police and fire protection. Governments are reluctant to charge for services which they seek, for political reasons, to provide equitably among the population. And some services, such as urban roads and streets, raise problematic issues in financing because they are both private and public goods. It is hard to exclude non-payers from using a road or street and it is difficult to measure "consumption" of the service. Some users will benefit financially from access to a new road or street, but most people will only receive the general benefits of living in a neighborhood or community with better roads. Of course, toll charges may be imposed, but this requires users to have adequate incomes to pay the costs. Levying too many toll charges for public facilities in communities with large numbers of poor households runs political risks for local officials and may be socially unacceptable. The construction and maintenance of streets and highways in developing countries is often seen as the government's obligation, which makes it difficult to convince citizens to pay special fees for them and for government officials to consider imposing too many tolls.

Co-financing or co-provision is an arrangement through which the users participate in providing services or maintaining a facility, and thereby reduce the overall costs to a level lower than if the services or infrastructure were provided entirely by government. Local nontax community resources can often be mobilized for co-financing through exchange of services or labor of beneficiaries in return for extension of services or infrastructure by local governments. Fiestas, community fairs, and the solicitation of ad-hoc contributions and donations have been used to raise funds for self-help service provision. Some communities have created small-scale productive activities to raise funds for services and for infrastructure construction and maintenance. UNICEF (1982) has successfully organized self-help provision of basic services in poor neighborhoods in cities in Brazil, Peru, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mexico

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and Indonesia.

Co-financing of services includes all forms in which citizens take an active role in aiding in service delivery, producing goods and services, or supplementing professional service providers in delivering or maintaining public services.

Among the advantages of co-financing are that it can reduce the overall cost of services to users and reduce the financial burden on national or municipal governments. Co-financing allows services to be extended to areas where they would normally not be provided, reduces the amount of resources that the municipality must devote to extending or maintaining services, and often increases the service level that can be obtained with limited government resources. Thus, co-provision can increase both the equity and the efficiency of service delivery (Ferris, 1984).

Optimism regarding community self-help should not, however, mask some important problems with this approach. There may, for instance, be inherent barriers to establishing self-help programs in countries where there is significant political opposition to the organization of cohesive interest groups. Moreover, the rigid sectoral channels through which services are delivered in most countries may inhibit cooperation among the specialized government agencies that are needed to provide technical and financial assistance. Also, it may be more difficult to organize cohesive groups to participate in self-help programs in cities, where the demands for services and infrastructure are often greatest, than in rural areas (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1988).

Expansion of local general revenues is another means of financing public services and facilities. Property taxes and other indirect charges must be used to pay for those services that are of value to the community as a whole, but for which the costs are not linked directly to specific beneficiaries or users.

In most developing countries, there is considerable scope for improving the effectiveness of local tax collections and the efficiency of expenditures. But in many countries,

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inefficient land registration systems, outdated cadastres and inefficient assessment practices, along with inadequate tax enforcement and collection, mean that most municipal governments receive only a small portion of the potential revenues they could generate if their tax assessment and collection systems were efficiently administered. Property transfer records are inadequate in municipalities in most developing countries and local governments lack qualified personnel for assessment and collection. Political interference in local tax collection and enforcement also undermines the capacity of municipalities to expand their general revenues (Prakash, 1988; Opkala, 1983; Mahar and Dillinger, 1983).

Because of these and other administrative weaknesses only 5 to 25 percent of local revenues in 25 countries surveyed by the World Bank (1988b) were raised by property taxes.

The ability of municipalities to expand general revenues to finance public services must be strengthened in most countries as a part of the decentralization process.

Intergovernmental transfers provide loans or grants to local governments from national general revenue sources, or earmarked funds from specific revenue sources such as tax surcharges, import duties, fees and fines, amusement or entertainment taxes or public lotteries.

Transfers can be made through: a) a shared tax, which is collected by the central government and shared with local jurisdictions: b) formula grants, by which the central government distributes resources by specified criteria such as population size or number of service users residing in a jurisdiction; c) ad-hoc grants for particular types of services or facilities that the central government wishes to promote; d) reimbursement grants for certain specific types of expenditures made by local governments; e) tax credits to individuals and businesses for investing in specified activities or producing particular goods and services that government is encouraging; and f) vouchers to individuals or households that can be used to purchase goods and services from local

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governments or private organizations.

A system of financial transfers from national to local governments may be necessary to account for spillover effects and to maintain some degree of fiscal equity among local jurisdictions (Bird, 1984). In addition, there are several advantages to using grants or subsidies to help local organizations provide some types of services (Hatry, 1983). Although the grant represents a cost to the central government, it may be less than the full cost of providing services and facilities directly. In addition, grants can be used to induce state, provincial or local levels of government or nongovernmental organizations to share some of the costs or to provide services that otherwise would have to be provided by the central government.

Some grants are subsidies to local governments or private organizations that allow them to provide services at below market prices in order to extend coverage to poor households. Moreover, if grants encourage more service providers to offer goods or services, it may increase competition in service provision and thereby expand consumer choice. Intergovernmental transfers also allow central governments to collect those revenues that they can raise more efficiently because of their larger jurisdiction, and to share the proceeds with localities. Grants can be used to assure the survival of local units of government or administration that might not be able to finance their operations entirely from local revenues, no matter how efficient they may be in taxing local resources (Bird, 1984).

Grants and subsidies also have potential disadvantages. In Colombia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia, for example, they have allowed the granting organization to exert strong controls and restrictions over the recipient organizations. This can lead to dependence of local governments on the central government. When grants become too large a percentage of local revenues, local governments have little incentive to expand their own revenue bases or to use the money efficiently. Grants and subsidies may reinforce and

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prolong inefficient operations by organizations receiving them (World Bank, 1988b).

Authorization of municipal borrowing, and the mobilization of government resources (through loan guarantees or subsidized credit) for borrowing by individuals to obtain services from private providers, are other means of financing public services.

Prudent borrowing can be an effective way of mobilizing capital for expensive infrastructure and facilities, especially when user charges or fees can be levied to recover costs. But local governments in developing countries have been severely restricted in their borrowing capacity by central government regulations and by weak financial markets for municipal securities. In most developing countries central governments strictly regulate and limit the ability of lower levels of government to borrow.

But as part of their decentralization policies, central governments in an increasing number of developing countries are recognizing the need to expand the borrowing capacity of local governments. The primary means is through the creation of municipal development or infrastructure development financial institutions. These municipal development financial institutions can be effective mechanisms for aggregating the fragmented capital markets in developing countries and increasing the supply of capital needed to expand services and construct infrastructure. Financial intermediaries can reduce the overall cost of capital through economies of scale and by offering a diverse portfolio of financial issues of different types, sizes and maturities. In most countries, municipal development financial institutions have greater flexibility and creditworthiness than local governments, and they not only offer credit, but also technical assistance to improve the management of investment projects and of municipal financial administration generally (World Bank, 1987). In addition, even those municipal development financial institutions that obtain their capital from the central government can place the intergovernmental

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transfer relationship on a more businesslike basis and can create a stronger sense of responsibility in municipal officials to repay their loans. Finally, these intermediaries can provide a means of involving the private sector in financing public services and infrastructure (Clarke, 1982).

Although municipal development financial institutes can perform important roles in mobilizing capital for local government investments, they also have potential disadvantages. In some of the more economically advanced developing countries, these institutions could displace or inhibit the expansion of private financial markets in providing capital to the public sector. In countries where the central government is the principal source of funding for these institutions, the financial intermediaries may simply serve as an instrument of intergovernmental transfers rather than as a mobilizer of new capital resources. In Mexico, Brazil, Honduras and India, municipal development funds have experienced serious operating problems, undermining their role in expanding municipal borrowing capacity (Clarke, 1982; Davey, 1987).

Employment generating service provision arrangements – that is, the use of service provision and infrastructure construction programs that employ the labor of community residents and beneficiaries to increase their incomes sufficiently to allow them to purchase services or pay the costs – can be a way of expanding effective demand for public goods.

One approach to raising effective demand is by organizing municipal service delivery to poor neighborhoods in ways that generate employment and income for the beneficiaries. UNICEF's (1982) basic services strategy attempts to improve services in urban areas while at the same time building the skills and raising the incomes of residents – and especially of women – in poor neighborhoods. Not only does this approach provide services less expensively than if they were offered by professionals, but the income derived from participation allows residents to pay for other services.

Cost reduction measures – through the modification or

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elimination of public regulations that artificially increase the price of public goods and services or that obstruct private sector provision of services and facilities, and through policies that provide services at lower cost — are also a source of additional financial resources.

In order to improve the efficiency with which they and private sector organizations deliver public services, governments in most developing countries must change land use, construction, and service delivery regulations to make them more appropriate to local conditions and needs. The costs of extending services can also be reduced if infrastructure and facilities are designed for multiple purposes, including employment generation, and modified in ways that are tailored to local needs and the ability of local governments to maintain them.

Local governments can also reduce costs and thereby make more funds available for new investment by reserving land that will be needed in the future for public services and facilities before costs are raised by inflation, speculation or development. In most developing countries, land acquisition costs are among the most expensive components of infrastructure and service provision. Among the ways that governments in developing countries can acquire the land needed for shelter, infrastructure, and services are through purchase in advance of need and the reservation of property through land banking. Land can be acquired in advance of need by purchasing it from private owners, and through bartering and exchange. Local governments can also acquire leasehold interests and options to buy. They can adopt and enforce appropriate land use regulations and controls to assure that adequate land will be available in the future for infrastructure and services in communities that are beginning to develop rapidly or to improve high levels of density. Governments in most developing countries can condemn privately held land and compensate owners to acquire the sites needed in the future for public facilities and infrastructure. Finally, national and local governments can provide tax advantages

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or exemptions to owners who make gifts, contributions and donations of land for public purposes.

A more indirect, but potentially important, alternative for reducing the costs of providing services and infrastructure over the long run is to develop programs that encourage migration to secondary or intermediate-sized cities where per capita costs of public service and infrastructure provision may be lower than in large metropolitan areas (Rondinelli, 1983).

Conclusions

Decentralization can be an effective means of improving economic and financial management in many developing countries. But it is not a panacea. Some types of public services and infrastructure are more amenable to decentralization than others. Moreover, all organizational and financial alternatives for decentralization have both advantages and disadvantages. Careful assessments must be made of appropriate organizational and financial means of decentralizing different types of services. In any case, it is unlikely that governments will be able to decentralize financial and management responsibilities to local governments, nongovernmental organizations or even the private sector without first making investments in strengthening the capabilities of these organizations to carry out those responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. Finally, it should be kept in mind that different forms of decentralization have different financial impacts. Decentralization may increase the costs of service and infrastructure provision and maintenance in the short run or may require local organizations to strengthen their financial base substantially before they can assume increased responsibilities.

Despite these constraints, in countries with highly centralized governments and where demand for public services is increasing rapidly, there may be few alternatives to decentralization. It is an approach that deserves and requires, careful assessment as part of economic adjustment policies aimed at improving economic and financial management.

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IS THE "ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL" MYTH TRUE? THE 1982 HOUSE RACES AS A CASE STUDY

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In races for the House of Representatives in the United States, unlike contests for the House of Commons in Great Britain, candidates and officeholders usually are longtime residents of a district. They invariably know hundreds, if not thousands, of the voters there on at least a casual basis, and supposedly champion the interests of the district once they reach Washington. A U.S. Representative traditionally has a down-to-earth relationship with his or her constituents. Thus when a Claude Pepper becomes the spokesman for the aged, he is advancing the interests of a considerable segment of the population of Miami, Florida, which has become a retirement center for those over 65.

Surveying the upcoming election of 1978, political columnist David Broder observed in the *Washington Post* that midterm Congressional races are won or lost because of local circumstances.[1] Others who have expressed similar opinions in recent years have been Speaker of the House Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, who maintained that all politics is local, and political newsletter author Horace Busby, who claimed that: "An off year election does not have a message outside a Congressman's own district."[3] During the 1982 midterm contest, moreover, *Time* stressed that these midterm contests are decided by local rather than by national issues.[4]

If this hypothesis is indeed true, one would expect that the following conditions would prevail in most Congressional races:

1) the candidates for the House would focus more on

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local issues than would the nominees for the Senate, whose perspective would be more statewide in scope;

2) the incumbent representatives would place a special emphasis on what they had done for the district, both in terms of constituent services and pork barrel legislation;

3) the electorate would be highly aware of who their current Representative is, since he or she tries to maintain a close rapport with people living in his or her district.

Scholars have paid far more attention to point three than they have to points one and two, so it is with respect to the latter that it is possible for one to make a real contribution to knowledge. Political scientists have actively pursued the study of voting statistics and public opinion polls, but this by no means exhausts the pertinent material which is available to the researcher.

A case in point is campaign literature, almost as ephemeral in character as such natural phenomena as the rainbow or the sunset. At least 99.9 per cent of this pre-election propaganda is destined for the trash can, sometimes before it is even opened. Yet the fact that it is quite transitory in no way denies the fact that at times it has had a significant impact on elections. No study of the latter is truly complete unless its author examines at least a sampling of this vast body of self-serving flyers, brochures, pamphlets, and newsletters.

According to one estimate, the quantity of political junk mail quadrupled between 1954 and 1970.[5] Still another scholar has calculated that the average House member sent out 450,000 pieces of franked mail in the midterm election year of 1966.[6] The activities of the Publications Division Service, better known as the House folding room, traditionally has peaked in October of election years.[7] Although some pieces are done in a more professional manner than others, the overwhelming bulk of these flyers, brochures, pamphlets, and newsletters is quite orthodox in format. On rare occasions this campaign literature may take a more experimental form. In 1984 Republican challenger Richard Armey upset

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the well-known Democratic Representative, Tom Vandergriff, in a North Texas House race, after the Armey campaign had released a comic book picturing on its cover a midget Tom Vandergriff stuck in the pocket of an immense "Tip" O'Neill.[8] (Armey won a narrow victory.)

Unfortunately, regardless of whether it is stereotyped or experimental there are no significant depositories of campaign literature, if only because the creation, printing, and dissemination of this is usually the responsibility of the candidate rather than of the state party or the national party. If one wants to build up an extensive collection of this pre-election propaganda, therefore, it is necessary to contact as many officeholders and candidates as possible during the course of the campaign. This is no easy task, since it is first necessary to obtain the names and addresses of the National Committeepersons and the State Chairpersons in all 50 states from the Republican and Democratic National Committees, and then in turn to obtain the names and addresses of the incumbents up for re-election and the challengers seeking office from these National Committeepersons and State Chairpersons.

The author of this article in implementing this plan of action in 1982 received responses from over two-thirds of the gubernatorial candidates, with a similarly high percentage for the Senate contests.[9] As for the House races, he collected 246 pieces of campaign literature, which we will examine in detail during the remainder of this paper. Although there currently are 435 Representatives in the lower house of Congress, this does not mean that each incumbent has a serious challenger, since in recent years perhaps no more than 100 of these districts have been truly competitive. By 1986 the re-election success rate for incumbent Representatives in the general election had approached the 100 per cent level, after hovering around the 90 per cent mark in recent elections. Nevertheless, such invulnerable party leaders as Speaker "Tip" O'Neill and Speaker-to-be Jim Wright still mailed out flyers, brochures, pamphlets, and newsletters to

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their districts in 1982. (The highest ranking Republican Representative, Robert Michel, barely survived a strong Democratic re-election challenge in his economically troubled district during that year.)

Taken as a whole, this immense collection of pre-election propaganda tracts from every corner of the United States reflects those issues currently preoccupying both the members of Congress and the citizens back home. The ten issues which appeared most frequently in the campaign literature of both major parties were, in order of the frequency of citation:

Total Number of Citation	Specific Issue: Times Mentioned
131	Social Security
128	Reduce federal deficits/balance the budget
122	More jobs
98	Lower interest rates
96	Support education
82	Restrain governmental spending/cut waste
78	Protect the environment
77	Improve the economy
75	Assistance to agriculture
68	Help senior citizens in various ways

The ranking by frequency of citation was quite similar for those 107 officeholders and challengers who identified themselves as Democrats, but the latter did not give top priority to either (1) restrain governmental spending or (2) assistance to agriculture:

Total Number of Citations	Specific Issue: Times Mentioned
70	Social Security

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66	More jobs
57	Support education
54	Reduce federal deficits/balance the budget
51	Protect the environment
45	Lower interest rates
41	Redistribute taxes/make them more fair
37	Help senior citizens in various ways
37	Improve the economy
35	Eliminate defense waste

As for the 92 Republican officeholders and challengers, their ranking diverged even further from the composite list, since as a group they did not include in the top ten issues (1) support education; (2) protect the environment; (3) assistance to agriculture; or (4) help senior citizens in various ways:

Total Number of Citations	Specific Issue: Times Mentioned
48	Reduce federal deficits/balance the budget
45	Restrain governmental spending/stop waste
43	More jobs
40	Social Security
37	Reduce taxes
34	Lower interest rates
33	Strong national defense
30	Restrict the influence of government over people
29	Reduce inflation
29	Improve the economy

Despite the Reagan Administration's positioning of the 25 per cent cut in federal income tax rates as the top priority item in its agenda of domestic reforms, tax reduction only ranks fifth on the Republican check list, tax redistribution

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and tax fairness only seventh in the Democratic ranking. (One Democratic House leader, Thomas Foley of Washington State, came out for moderately increasing taxes.) Instead, the overall leader in the composite tabulation was Social Security, which also stood first on the Democratic checklist. With its foundations becoming increasingly shaky as a bipartisan commission was preparing to recommend various reforms, it was not expected that Social Security would be in the top ten. But what is surprising was the reluctance of so many officeholders and candidates of both parties openly to admit that the Social Security system was in real danger. Among the few candidates who confronted the issue directly was Republican incumbent Henry Hyde of Illinois, who discussed this "sacred cow" at length in his campaign literature, commenting that "The worst myth about Social Security is that there is no problem."

With the state of the economy frequently a decisive issue in elections in which there is no Presidential race (it may, of course, impact on White House contests as well), one would expect that the composite checklist for 1982 would reflect this. And it does, with a large number of references to more jobs, lower interest rates, improvement of the economy, and assistance to agriculture. In contrast, what is missing from the top ten issues — and from the next ten as well — was foreign policy, which played such an important role in the midterm elections of 1950 (Korean War), 1962 (Cuban missile crisis), and 1966 (Vietnam War). Sixteen years later, in 1982, only six candidates mentioned the Southeast Asia conflict, three as former opponents of U.S. involvement, two as prisoners of war, and one as a disabled veteran. (Two also referred to the still unresolved MIA issue.) Five candidates registered their opposition to the two Panama Canal treaties, while four noted their lack of enthusiasm for the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. Then there were the three candidates who advocated former President Jimmy Carter's human rights crusade.

But regardless of whether one looks at the composite

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checklist, or the Republican and Democratic rankings, what he or she does *not* find are truly local issues. If indeed all politics is local, then why do these tabulations not exhibit more of a local orientation? Every item on all three checklists has either a completely national or a partially national focus. Generally speaking, too, the rankings for House candidates of each party parallel those for Senate candidates of each party. Social Security is the leading issue for both Democratic Senate and House candidates, while reduce-federal deficits/balance-the-budget is the main concern of both Republican Senate and House nominees. House members may only represent a district, while a U.S. Senator is the spokesman for an entire state, but with regard to the issues there is no evidence throughout this large body of 1982 campaign literature that the former have a significantly more parochial orientation on the issues.

It may be argued that although most incumbent Representatives concern themselves with broad national issues such as those which we have mentioned above, they still take care of the needs and desires of their district through constituent services and pork barrel legislation. One would logically assume that if this were true, then the member of the House who is active in these two areas would mention this fact in his or her campaign literature. Significantly, however, neither in the case of constituent services (38 per cent) or pork barrel legislation (19 per cent) do a majority of the House members cite what they have personally done to help their districts! The 43 incumbent Representatives who mention constituent services include 16 Republicans and 19 Democrats, while the 21 who refer to pork barrel legislation include 9 Republicans and 9 Democrats. (The remainder of the House members in each category do not identify their partisan affiliation.)

By constituent services we do not mean appearing at local town meetings, or sending out form letter responses to voters who write their Representative. Rather, we mean actually helping constituents on an individual basis. Thus 1980

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Presidential aspirant Philip Crane of Illinois reported that he was receiving between 1,000 and 1,200 letters each week, and that his staff was investigating more than 1,000 cases each year. As for individuals who tabulated the results of his or her entire House career, Representative Fernand J. St. Germain (D-Rhode Island) proudly boasted that since 1961 "His offices in Washington and Rhode Island have assisted well over 25,000 persons seeking help," while Representative Don Young (R-Alaska) likewise bragged that "Since 1973, when he was elected to Congress, Don Young has responded to over 200,000 requests for help and information from Alaskans."

It is difficult to prove which Representative was the most active in helping his or her constituents, but Gerry Studds (D-Massachusetts) lay claim "to having more personal contact with the district's residents than any other Congressman in the nation." Yet Larry Craig (R-Idaho) probably could maintain that he had kept the most comprehensive statistical record of constituency contacts: 27 town meetings, 224 town forums, 3 Social Security meetings, 5 regulatory reform task forces, 2 agricultural meetings, 54,491 letters to Idaho citizens, 2 district-wide questionnaires, and 838 individual cases. Then there was Al Swift (D-Washington), who expressed pride at being the first member of the House to establish a toll-free telephone system. As for more unusual constituent services, one should turn to Tom Downey (D-New York). A lady from Islip complained that "Our neighborhood was plagued by mosquitoes. Many people had gotten very sick and bitten badly. .. ." Fortunately, thanks to Tom Downey, local government people in conjunction with federal officials alleviated the situation.

While constituent services rarely cost the U.S. government a great deal, pork barrel legislation does. The 88 billion dollar highway bill passed over President Ronald Reagan's veto in April 1987 is a case in point. Restraining governmental spending and stopping waste was the second ranking item on the list of the most frequently cited issues in Republican

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campaign literature during 1982, but G.O.P. members of Congress at times do vote to bring home pork to their districts, just as do their Democratic counterparts. The latter usually are more concerned about eliminating waste in defense spending (this ranks tenth on their list) than they are in cutting the fat from social programs, but on occasion even a liberal Democrat will admit that the government is appropriating too much money. A case in point was Peter Kostmayer (D-Pennsylvania). To quote his campaign literature, "We must reject 'pork-barrel' politics and the philosophy that a wasteful and needless project is never one located in a Member's home district." The fiscally conservative National Taxpayer's Union ranked Kostmayer in the top ten per cent of the House of Representatives, a rare honor for a liberal Democrat.

In contrast, some members of Congress point with pride to the pork which they have brought home to their districts. Thus Jim Howard (D-New Jersey) cited $326 million in federal funds which he had secured for New Jersey Transit's bus and rail capital improvement program. Interstate Highway I-95, his campaign literature noted, should be called "Howard's Highway." (At the same time he admitted to being somewhat pessimistic about his re-election chances.) Then there was Morris Udall (D-Arizona), who stressed his efforts on behalf of the Central Arizona Project, which has played such an important role in the economic development of that state. Among the Republican pork barrelers was Gene Atkinson of Pennsylvania, who mentioned his maneuverings in support of the Beaver Falls-New Brighton bridge, the New Castle postal facility, and the Ellwood City senior citizens housing project. Another G.O.P. member of Congress from Pennsylvania, Robert Walker, was perhaps more typical of his party in his attempt to eliminate unneeded pork barrel appropriations for such esoteric projects as national condom week, a "rubber" disco, and a solar-powered dog house. (This was before the number of AIDS cases escalated.)

A member of the lower house of Congress a Representa-

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tive only casts one vote out of 435, while a Senator casts one vote out of 100. Thus the former has a fourth and a fifth of the impact on the vote outcome which the latter does. A Representative, however, also has a chance to serve on committees and to make his or her presence felt there. But unless one is the Chairperson of the committee, or a high ranking majority or minority member, his or her influence on its deliberations may not be that great, even though he or she will still cast a vote. In addition, the committee may not necessarily deal with the leading interests of a Representative's constituency.

Of the 112 incumbent Representatives, a total of 71 (or 63 per cent) mentioned their committee service: 23 Republicans, 32 Democrats, and 16 who do not state their political affiliation. Here we might begin by citing Mississippi Democrat Jamie Whitten of the powerful Appropriations Committee; earlier in the year the other Representatives voted him to be "the most effective committee chairman in the U.S. Congress."[10] Less conservative than Whitten was fellow Democrat Bill Ford of Michigan, who in 1981 had become the Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which has jurisdiction over the federal civilian labor force. Ford was born into a working class family, and attended Henry Ford Trade School, where he witnessed at close range some of labor's most turbulent years. But while Representatives such as Whitten and Ford described their committee work in their campaign literature, some of their colleagues merely cited the fact that they were serving on various committees without comment. If they used their committee assignments to do anything for their districts, it is not evident from their flyers, brochures, pamphlets, and newsletters.

According to Richard Fenno, author of *Congressmen in Committees*, members of Congress serve on different committees for different reasons. Eighty-one per cent of the members whom he interviewed "had deliberately sought and actively worked for assignments to the committees on which

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they sat."[12] Members of the Appropriations Committee and the Ways and Means Committee desire "to have more influence inside the House than other Congressmen;" members of the Interior Committee and Post Office Committee "have the primary goal of helping their constituents and thereby insuring their re-election;" members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Labor Committee, and the Education Committee "want to help make good public policy."[13] There well may be some validity to this sophisticated attempt to differentiate among the different committees from the standpoint of wanting to serve on them, but the campaign literature of the members of Congress which we have examined for 1982 neither proves nor disproves Fenno's hypothesis.

To be an effective member of Congress one must spend a great deal of time in Washington. On the other hand, if a member of Congress does not hold regularly scheduled town meetings back in his or her district and maintain at least a relatively high profile there, then the opposing party may charge that the incumbent House member has begun to lose touch with the voters. In some instances this accusation may be substan- tiated. To quote Republican Olympia Snowe of Maine, "Send someone to Washington and that's the last you see of them." This being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that only 17 members of Congress, or 19 per cent of the total of 112 whose campaign literature we are surveying, emphasized their high frequency Congressional attendance.

According to still another work by Richard Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, in 1973 U.S. Representatives averaged thirty-five trips home, with the median number being thirty.[14] The average number of days spent in the district (counting recesses) was 138, with about a third of the members going home to their districts every single weekend. The frequency of trips home, though, did not increase as electoral margins declined, or vice versa. As one would ex- pect, Representatives from the Far West made the fewest trips home, while Easterners (who also went home

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the most often) ranked the highest in the allocation of resources to their districts, in large part because of the welfare-social services case load which is greater in the older urbanized areas. "Among the factors that appear to influence the allocation of a Representative's time and money to his or her district are personal goals, family residence, distance, established local ex- pectations, and the desire to create new local expectations."[15] A Representative's frequent presence in his or her district, however, by no means guarantees that he or she will become universally known there, as earlier scholarly studies have demonstrated. Voter identification of House members does not even begin to approach the 100 per cent mark, no matter how much publicity the incumbent receives, or how much he or she does to assist the district. According to pollster George Gallup, the percentage of those surveyed who could identify their Representative was 50 per cent in 1942, and 53 per cent in 1976.[16] On the other hand, political scientist Candice J. Nelson claimed that the electorate's knowledge of incumbent candidates actually fell from 51 per cent in 1964 to 34 per cent in 1974.[17] Then there is political scientist John Ferejohn, who maintained that between 1958 and 1970 63 per cent of the voters knew the name of the incumbent Representative seeking re-election in a Presidential election year, while the figure declined to 55 per cent in the midterm contests.[18] These three sets of figures fail to coincide, but they nevertheless reveal that the electorate's awareness of an incumbent Representative is not high.

Since House incumbents and challengers on the average are less well known than Senatorial and gubernatorial incumbents and challengers, it should come as no surprise that a larger number of House incumbents and challengers openly identified themselves with a political party in their campaign literature than did their Senatorial and gubernatorial counterparts. Less than a quarter of the state house candidates openly described themselves as either Republicans or Democrats, while approximately 60 per cent of the upper

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house nominees did so, with Democratic candidates more likely to do so than their Republican counterparts by a narrow margin. In contrast to these figures for gubernatorial and Senatorial candidates, no less than 200 out of the 246 House incumbents and challengers mentioned their partisan affiliation in their campaign literature: over four out of five, or 81 per cent.

Included among these 200 partisans were 108 Democrats and 92 Republicans, a 54/46 per cent split. One hundred sixteen of these candidates, or 58 per cent, were challengers, while 84, or 42 per cent, were incumbents. There were 27 favorable references to President Ronald Reagan from the Republicans, and 22 negative statements from the Democrats (14 of whom complained about Reaganomics). Fourteen Republicans were pictured together with the chief executive, but such moments hardly guarantee intimacy or influence with the President. Documents from the Eisenhower and Ford Libraries which this author has examined reveal that the chief executive spent no more than a minute or two with 19 various House candidates during mass picture-taking sessions.

As for the other political leaders who are referred to in this large and diverse body of campaign literature, no one came close to the frequency of citations enjoyed by President Reagan. Controversial Interior Secretary James Watt came under attack from nine Democrats, with Frank Frost of California openly proclaiming that: "I think Watt is crazy, for one thing. Anyone who says the Lord is coming, so it doesn't matter whether we've savaged our resources." The Democrats also mentioned Representative Claude Pepper of Florida positively seven times (thanks to his efforts on behalf of the elderly), but the 1980 Democratic ticket of Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale was nowhere in sight two years later. Other contemporary political leaders mentioned two or three times included George Bush, Jesse Helms, Jack Kemp, Guy Vander Jagt, John Glenn, and Richard Lamm. As for the more distant past, there were isolated references to Herbert

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Hoover, the New Deal, Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson.

It is highly significant that when a candidate did mention another political leader of his or her party, it rarely was a county commissioner, a mayor, or a city councilperson. If politics were indeed local, then there would be as many references to these lower level officials as to Representatives, Senators, Governors, and presidents. In reality there is not, and this fact undercuts further the validity of the all politics is local hypothesis.

There also is the matter of ideological affiliation: whether one is a conservative or a liberal, or occupies the middle ground. Only one gubernatorial candidate of each party overtly identified with conservatism — and none with liberalism — in the campaign literature which this author examined. Nor did any Senatorial candidate openly embrace the liberal tradition, although six Republicans and one Democrat said that they were conservatives. Here the percentage of candidates acknowledging an ideological affiliation (15 per cent) was approximately the same as it was for the House candidates, where one out of six took a stance somewhere along the conservative-liberal spectrum.

Of those 39 candidates who labelled themselves ideologically, 27 proclaimed that they were conservatives. As for the rest, one candidate was a conservative moderate, three were moderate/middle of the road, four were anti-right wing, three were avowedly liberal, and one was neither liberal nor conservative. No candidate was more negative than Republican House candidate Cissy Baker of Tennessee (the daughter of Senator Howard Baker), who proclaimed in losing that she was distrustful of big cities, big labor, big business, and big government. Significantly, while eight of the candidates affirmed that they were fiscal conservatives, not a single one stated that he or she was a social conservative. (This statistic parallels the infrequent mention of issues identified with the social conservative position throughout this large and diverse body of campaign literature.) Certain-

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ly social conservatives as well as fiscal conservatives played a major role in bringing about the so-called "Reagan Revolution," but the material examined here reveals that they may have given more than they received in return from the new administration in Washington. The most frequently cited social conservative issues were opposition to gun control (11 out of 246), advocacy of school prayer (9), and opposition to abortion (9). Each of these issues enlisted the support of no more than 4 per cent of all candidates, hardly a significant percentage. In fact, there were more women candidates (16) than there were references to abortion, either positive or negative!

Since the time of the New Deal, conservatism has been identified with states rights more than with national action, especially in the South. If the national government is to withdraw from certain fields of endeavor under a conservative administration in Washington, one would expect that the state, county, and city governments would take over at least some of these functions. (This would be the inevitable result if some of the proposed cuts in the domestic programs of the national government went into effect.) But while 42 of the candidates (30 of them Republican) talked in terms of restricting the influence of Washington over people, and of reducing the governmental bureaucracy, there are few, if any, proposals to let local authorities do what the national government has been doing. If all politics is indeed local, then one would anticipate more references to the transfer of power there from Washington than one actually finds.

At this point some comments about the campaign literature of the House leaders of each major party may add an extra dimension to our presentation. Quite expectedly the Republican hierarchy on balance took a conservative stance, while the Democratic one in general supported liberal positions. Representative Phil Burton of California was probably the most left-leaning of the Democratic leaders, but his advocacy of gay rights is not surprising, in view of the fact that he was representing San Francisco in Congress.

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Burton was "credited by the *San Francisco Examiner* with having gotten more park land than any other human being since Theodore Roosevelt." As for Speaker of the House Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill of Massachusetts and Speaker-to-be Jim Wright of Texas, they both invoked the anti-special interests/friend-of-the-people theme. According to O'Neill, citizens "don't want special tax shelters; they just want to put groceries on the table." Likewise, "Those who have no powerful lobbies to represent us – have always had a strong champion and caring friend in Jim Wright," who "has never once forgotten where he comes from."

Such conservative Republican leaders as Robert Michel of Illinois sounded a similar note in their campaign literature: "If it won't play in Peoria, it isn't good for America. And its got to be good for America to get my vote." Other G.O.P. candidates, such as Newt Gingrich of Georgia, warned of the negative consequences of liberal officeholders in Washington: "Look out – the liberals are trying to pick your pocket again." "For nearly two decades this country has been decaying steadily." But unquestionably the most thought-provoking material furnished to the author was that of Jack Kemp of New York, a Republican Presidential candidate who became identified with federal income tax cuts prior to Ronald Reagan taking over the White House. Kemp not only bragged of bringing home pork to his district just as his ideological antithesis, Phil Burton, had done across the continent, he also noted his opposition to "corporate welfare" subsidies to big business: Exxon, Union Oil, Gulf, etc. Kemp, moreover, openly identified himself as a friend of working men and women by favoring the restoration of unemployment benefits and a halt to the F.T.C. harassment of the Grain Millers Union. These are not the type of stances which one would expect a man of the political right to take, but one must keep in mind the demographic makeup of the New Yorker's district.

In summary, those scholars who attempt to apply the all politics is local hypothesis to the House of Representatives for

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recent elections other than 1982 probably will find that both incumbent members of the House and their challengers are as concerned with national issues as they are with parochial matters, if indeed they are not more so. Moreover, rather than take an independent stance which places loyalty to the district first, they will usually stress their partisan affiliation, but more likely than not they will not overtly identify themselves with a political ideology. They also may refrain from singling out which constituent services they provide for any persons living in their districts, and only in a decided minority of cases will they invoke the pork barrel.

But regardless of whether they are Republicans or Democrats, conservative or liberals, or anti-spenders or pork barrelers, incumbent members of the House almost invariably win re-election. This was true of 1984, 1986, and 1988, just as it was of 1982. One may debate whether this is due to their support of the ideologies and interests peculiar to their districts, or whether it is attributable to inertia and indifference on the part of the electorate, but the fact remains that this diverse body of men and women representing a highly variegated group of districts possess an uncanny talent for political self-preservation which has eluded their gubernatorial, and to a lesser degree their Senatorial, counterparts.

FOOTNOTES

1. "America Goes Conservative," in *Economist*, November 11, 1978, p. 44.
2. "Losing a Fragile Coalition," in *Time*, November 15, 1982, p. 23.
3. Quoted in Hugh Sidey, "Don't Scratch the Offyear Itch," in *Time*, November 1, 1982, p. 21. Busby was once an aide to Lyndon Johnson.
4. See "Trimming the Sails," in *Time*, November 15, 1982, p. 14: "Congressional elections tend to be a parochial mixture of personalities and local concerns, and are usually not settled by national issues."
5. David Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," in *Polity*, Spring 1974, pp. 295ff, quoted in John A. Ferejohn, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections," in *American Political Science Review*, March 1977, p. 169.
6. Consult David A. Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968). p. 109. Quoted in Richard Born, "House Incumbents and Inter-Election Vote Changes," in *Journal of Politics*, November 1977,

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p. 1023.

7. Albert D. Cover, "One Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," in *American Journal of Political Science*, August 1977, pp. 537-8. There is a chart on p. 538 comparing folding room activity on a monthly basis during both election and non-election years.

8. The title of the anti-Vandergriff, pro-Armey comic book was "It's Your Choice." For a discussion of its impact, see Luke Johnson and Bob Bocell. "Armey comics funny to some, not to others," in *Arlington, Texas Citizen Journal*, October 21, 1984, pp. 1A-2A.

9. He has published a companion article entitled "The deceptive nature of American politics: gubernatorial and senatorial elections of 1982, in *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Winter 1987, pp. 401-18.

10. *U.S. News and World Report*, March 15, 1982, p. 23.

11. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).

12. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3, 5, and 9.

14. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978).

15. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

16. Cover, p. 539.

17. Candice J. Nelson, "The effect of Incumbency on Voting in Congressional Elections, 1964-1974," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Winter 1978-79, p. 671. To quote Nelson, "It seems despite increased use of the perquisites of their office, House members were unable to transfer these resources into greater voter recognition."

18. Ferejohn, p. 170.

19. The author of this article is surveying midterm elections since World War II – which includes the Eisenhower and Ford presidencies – in a manuscript that he is completing which is tentatively entitled *The Kaleidoscope of Politics*.

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BOOK REVIEW ARTICLE

COMMUNIST AND FAR LEFT ORGANIZATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

By Joel Sikorski

FAR LEFT OF CENTER; THE AMERICAN RADICAL LEFT TODAY
Harvey Klehr
Transaction Books, New Brunswick

Harvey Klehr has produced a comprehensive survey of contemporary communist organizations operating in the United States today. Abundant studies of far left radical groups had been made during the Sixties, when they were at the peak of their popularity, but during the past decade, although many of them have actually grown in influence as they have learned to present their message more subtly and have succeeded in infiltrating many establishment organizations, not least in the university world, the spotlight has largely moved away from them. This has allowed them to operate more effectively, especially those that seek clandestine influence rather than dramatic action at the barricades. In consequence, Harvey Klehr's study, commissioned by the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith, will serve as an eye-opening and eyebrow-raising introduction to a world of political activity which few Americans would readily imagine existed in their midst.

The media in general makes little mention of activist groups on the far left, except when someone gets kidnapped or killed by them, and even on such occasions no effort seems to be made to inform the public about the history or nature of the groups in question. Yet as author Klehr points out, while Marxist-Leninism has been widely discredited as a working ideology in the Communist-controlled world, a

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large variety of Marxist-Leninist groups still thrive in America, and even though membership is not large, they often exert an influence far out of proportion to their size, often without the people they influence realizing their existence. Their secret is in making full use of seemingly respectable front groups, and well-meaning but politically naive persons who can be used to advance their chosen causes.

To start with an obvious example. Today McCarthyism is virtually tainted word. Any effort made by any political analyst to expose a front organization's ties with these little-known Marxist cells will immediately be attacked as 'McCarthyism' and will be rejected with a well-trained knee-jerk reaction by the gullible public. Anti-communism, thanks to the insidious and effective efforts of the Left, has come to be regarded as un-American. It is seen as an attack upon freedom, whereas Klehr sees it as an attack upon those who would suppress freedom. Communist regimes have persistently, as author Klehr points out, crushed freedom, maintained their tyranny with the aid of secret police, and deprived the public and intellectuals alike of the right to free speech and free debate. Yet in freedom-loving America today, anyone who publicly seeks to draw attention to the activities and influence of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist organizations is almost automatically characterized as a narrow reactionary, an intolerant fascist, an enemy of freedom.

Klehr's book is divided into three parts. The first of these updates what is popularly known about the CPUSA, or the Communist Party of America. This remains the largest and most powerful of the myriad Marxist-Leninist groups in America, and although still small its membership is growing steadily. It exerts considerable influence in the Labor movement, in the Black movement and on American college campuses. Most of its more effective work is done through front groups such as the National Alliance Against Racism and Political Repression (a name calculated to immediately prejudice any receptive listener), Women for Racial and

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Economic Equality, the seemingly innocuous U.S. Peace Council, or the scholarly-sounding Labor Research Association.

The second part of the book, dealing with the lesser-understood and kaleidoscopic variety of Trotskyist, Maoist and other Marxist-Leninist organizations, is probably the most colorful. It describes smaller extremist organizations which, especially during the Sixties and Seventies, devoted themselves to promoting public disturbances, being too weak to exert influence in any other way. Lacking the in-depth infiltration achievements of the CPUSA and its front organizations, these are made up of zealots who constantly reorganize and regroup themselves, and as such are difficult to follow. Possibly the best known of these is the Weathermen – now virtually extinct.

The third part of the book is possibly the most important, since it covers organizations which, while avoiding the label Marxist-Leninist, express strong hostility to many aspects of American domestic and foreign policy, largely sharing with the Marxist-Leninist groups their choice of targets. Prominent amongst these latter are the Clergy and Laity Concerned (formerly Clergy and Laity Concerned about the Vietnam War), the National Lawyers Guild, and Mobilization for Survival.

Klehr takes care to point out that he is not defending the American far right, but simply drawing attention to the creeping threat from a well-organized and often silent but active far left. Many of the letter organizations not only seek to strike down the defenses of the free world against communism, but also show overt hostility towards the Jews, and especially Zionism. He points to the well-known 'anti-Semitism' of Karl Marx, the apostate rabbi's son, who saw socialism as breaking down the religious, economic and ethnic/national barriers that are at the center of Zionist and Jewish consciousness. Come the revolution, Marx declared, Jews like all other nations would eventually lose their separate identity, so that mankind would be able to live in

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peace. Marx attacked Jews as the very symbols of capitalism, accusing them of putting base self-interest before all other considerations, constantly huckstering to obtain their goals, and worshipping money beyond all other values. While Jews are common amongst the radical left organizations, these are mostly Jews like Karl Marx, who see Zionism as lying at the very center of Western capitalism, controlling and manipulating it, and hence they see Zionism as the enemy of all the peoples of the world. Indeed, as the author points out, it was Marxists who popularized the slogan "Zionism is racism."

The mainline CPUSA, Klehr reports, has frequently aligned itself with extremist Arab interests against Israel and Zionism, but at the same time has formed several front groups seeking to gain support from within the Jewish community. Clearly, the struggle between Jewish Marxist students and the Zionist students at the University of Berlin during the closing decades of the last century, so graphically documented in Shmyra Levin's *Youth In Revolt*, is still being fought by this faction. The CPUSA front groups which seek to infiltrate the youth of Jewish society in contemporary America write constantly about "the reactionary racist character of Zionism" and about Zionism's "poisonous influence on the Jewish masses (*sic*)." Herbert Aptheker has stated that Ariel Sharon's speeches "remind one of Hitler," and argued that the Phalangist massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatilla were masterminded by the Phalangist's Israeli backers. The CPUSA is behind the publication *Jewish Affairs*, which works with front groups such as Jewish Americans for World Peace, and collaborates with official Soviet organizations such as the Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee and the official Soviet Yiddish newspaper *Sovietische Heimland*.

Another group entitled The Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East is named by Klehr as "supporting the same goals as the CPUSA," and reprints articles by leaders of the Israel Communist Party. Recently Herbert Aptheker has

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coined the term "Commentary Jews" to refer to the capitalist-Zionist Jews whom he believes have betrayed the Marxist creed of socialist egalitarianism to which he adheres. In general the efforts to spread Communism among fellow-Jews in America is spearheaded by Lewis Moroze, as head of the CPUSA's Jewish Commission.

One of the more influential Trotsykist organizations that has become well-known for its activities during past decades is the Students for a Democratic Society, more commonly known simply as SDS. Essentially this grew out of the ongoing, constantly changing and reforming assemblage of radical socialist-Marxist groups, it seems to have been closely allied to the Progressive Labor Party, which has been described as a Marxist-Leninist sect (Klehr p.87). It originated amongst a group of extreme radicals who split with the CPUSA in 1959, who were joined by other radicals expelled from the CPUSA in 1961, for criticizing its leadership as being too moderate. Having attracted support by sponsoring (illegal) trips to Cuba, in 1962 these radicals launched a journal entitled *Progressive Labor*, and in 1965 formed the PLP at a convention attended by some 200 supporters.

Membership of the PLP grew rapidly to some fifteen hundred, mostly recruited from among students of middle class background. Milt Rosen, Bill Epton and Mort Scheer became dominant among the leadership, but Epton, who had been convicted of inciting violence in the 1964 Harlem riots, was expelled for "black nationalism," on the grounds that all nationalism of any kind was reactionary and contrary to Marxist ideology.

The PLP's earliest youth movement was known as the May 2nd Movement, but this was disbanded and its members instructed to join the growing SDS. During the late 1960s the PLP seems to have been allied to Maoist groups, and "exercised a significant role in the Students for a Democratic Society." According to Klehr, "within SDS the PLP argued for a worker-student alliance," but at the "tumultuous" 1969 SDS convention the PLP had to face a split within the SDS

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movement, retaining control of the main section but losing members to two new SDS factions, one allied to the Weathermen and the other to the Revolutionary Youth Movement.

PLP now began efforts to infiltrate many spheres of society, boosting sales of a publication called *Challenge*. Concentrating on minority groups, in 1971 the PLP formed the International Committee against Racism (InCAR) and the Anti-Racist Farmworkers, the latter working among Mexican immigrant labor. Infiltration of Moslems in America was conducted through a publication called *Al Tahaddi*. But it was the International Committee Against Racism, headed by Dr. Robert Kinlock, Toby Schwartz, and Finley Campbell, a former professor, that was to become one of the prime front organizations of the PLP.

Efforts at open disruption were by no means confined to campuses during this period, and violent demonstrations were organized which forced their way into radio stations, wrecked movie theaters, and threw bricks, rocks and bottles as a part of their "anti-racist" crusade. Slogans such as "Death to the Nazis" were intermixed with criticism of Zionists as racists, and when a policeman was injured by their demonstrators, *Challenge* openly exalted over his wounds. Indeed, the PLP openly alleged that there was no difference between nazis and liberals, and used the term "fascist" indiscriminately against any who stood outside their movement. Thus the Polish Solidarity movement was labelled a "mass fascist movement", the Khomeini regime in Iran was described as "an ideal front for fascism and imperialism," and the Afghan freedom fighters against the puppet Marxist government were described as being composed of "anti-worker fascists", while even Mayor Washington of Chicago was called a "black social fascist." Scholars daring to discuss race, heredity and personality have been regularly labelled "fascists" or "nazis" by Marxist agitators.

While the SDS, by virtue of its very nature, featured heavily in campus disturbances against scholars whose

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research was perceived as presenting a challenge to the mythology of Marxism, the pervasive influence of Marxist organizations in the political and intellectual scene is so extensive, and so confusing, because of their custom of constantly changing names and reorganizing its alliances, that few realize the true extent of its operations. Thus, little known groups such as the lesbian Dykes Against Racism do their work unknown to the broader public. While Stokely Carmichael did win a name for himself as leader of the so-called Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (which was to become very violent) the identity of the true leaders or directors of these groups is generally kept a close secret. Indeed, when Weathermen formed an active front known as the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee, few ordinary Americans had ever heard of its existence despite the fact that at times its supporters shouted slogans such as Victory to the PLO, Zionism is Racism, and Defeat White Supremacy.

The PLP sponsored groups such as the Women's Committee Against Genocide, the May 19th Communist Organization (a New York terrorist group), the New Movement in Solidarity with Puerto Rican Independence and Socialism. It also had links to the group that carried out the attempted Brinks armored truck robbery. Surprisingly, when a Weatherman member, Kathy Boudin, was sentenced to prison for her part in the attempted holdup a petition organized in her support included such well known names as Noam Chomsky, the self-declared Marxist on the faculty at MIT, and the renowned author, Dr. Benjamin Spock.

What is perhaps the most remarkable is that when publicizing "student" and "faculty" criticism of scholars who dare to speak out to the public about what are generally well recognized links between genetics and human personality patterns, the media seldom cares to identify or comment upon the Marxist connections of many Marxist-sponsored demonstrations, leaving their readers to suppose that these protests were spontaneous and represented the general feeling of the student or worker body. Similarly, it seldom

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identifies the Marxist commitment of many whom it cites as "respected" academic authorities. In truth, the most serious harm that has been inflicted upon freedom of speech in our universities has been due to the constant readiness of seemingly innocuous faculty members to devote their lives to advancing Marxist ideals, and violently condemning those whose research would endanger the fundamental assumptions on which those ideals are based. This, they are able to do from the safety of the positions they have managed to secure in the academic world. The more successful of these individuals, although generally Marxist by sympathy from their student days, have been careful to avoid revealing their convictions until such time as they have secured their doctorates, obtained faculty positions, and published sufficient genuine academic material to qualify for promotion and tenure. Once they have gained tenure, they then tend to lose interest in politically unrelated research and teaching activities, and concentrate on teaching, writing and researching purely Marxist versions of the discipline they have infiltrated. It is often little known outside the academic world that organizations such as the American Anthropological Association help organize special sections at their major conferences for Marxist scholars to present papers on Marxist Anthropology or Marxist Sociology etc. Many Marxist faculty members also openly engage in campus politics — often working closely with student activists, and always ready to help fellow Marxist to gain appointment to such university positions as may fall vacant in their departments.

According to Klehr, the FBI have determined that certain of the CPUSA front organizations have drawn funds from Moscow, notably the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. How this may be affected by *perestroika* — if *perestroika* itself survives — is anyone's guess. Indeed, it has been said by otherwise knowledgeable people that there are today more ideological Marxists outside the Communist bloc than inside it. Certainly several of the leading Marxist activists in Western Europe are relatives of dedicated

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communists who lost power in the occupied East European countries, notably Poland, and felt it more fruitful to continue their extreme politics in the free West than under the repressive totalitarian governments that have inherited the Marxist tradition.

Other CPUSA front groups include the National anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with African Liberation which works closely with the African National Congress in South Africa, and the National Coalition to Fight Inflation and Unemployment. The leading CPUSA publications, which are numerous, include the *People's Daily World, Jewish Affairs*, the *New World Review*, the *Women for Racial and Economic Equality Review, Labor Today* (published for Trade Unionists for Action and Democracy), and *Voz del Pueblo*, the latter in Spanish for Hispanic immigrants. It is interesting to note that the CPUSA also publishes the *AIS-EIRI* for Irish Americans, seeking to cull support for the Marxist-aligned Irish Republican Army, which is suspected of deriving much of the funding for its murderous attacks on the police and military not only from Gaddaffi's Libya, but from the ignorance and generosity of the Irish community in America.

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BOOK REVIEW

PINSTRIPES AND REDS: AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CAUGHT BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE ROMANIAN COMMUNISTS, 1981-1985.

David B. Funderburk
Selous Foundation Press, Washington, D.C.

I have met Ambassador Funderburk on several occasions, and each time I was impressed with his frankness and integrity. As a native Romanian and author of a study concerning a related topic, I was anxious to read his book. Using a factual approach and written in a concise style, the book is well documented and easy to read. To me it was particularly interesting since I had met many of those mentioned in it, while many others he mentions are leaders of international stature known to all of us.

As the subtitle *An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists*, the prevailing hypothesis appears to be that there is (or was) a deep understanding and a convergence of goals and interests between the US government, as represented by the State Department élite, and the current Communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu on the one hand wanted to project an image of nationalism and independence of Moscow and allegedly he needed American support to challenge the Soviet domination. On the other hand, the State Department wanted to prove that Ceausescu's independence was real, and that it was in the American interest to help him split with Moscow. Once these illusory parameters ignoring geopolitical reality were established neither Ceausescu nor the State would accept any opinion or fact to the contrary.

As a professor and scholar, Funderburk was familiar with Romania where he had lived, worked, and performed research on several occasions. Thus, when he was appointed ambassador by President Reagan in 1981, he did not have to

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do his apprenticeship while on the job. Yet, the social and political reality that he found in Bucharest was so contrary to the projected image, that he soon became a sort of outcast, equally isolated and bypassed by both the Romanian government and the State Department.

The facts and observations chronicled in the book are overwhelming and disturbing. With a profound knowledge of the Romanian people and history, a good political grasp of communism, and a keen interest in his fellow humans, professor Funderburk could not be fooled by appearances. Slowly, he came to understand the entire tragedy of the Romanian people, the unspeakable cynicism and despotism of the regime, and the puzzling attitude of the State Department which, in his own words, reveals "a lack of sympathy for putting American interests first; and a tendency toward internationalism, détentism, and compromise with communists."

Funderburk traces the current US policy toward Eastern Europe to Kissinger and his protegés. Lawrence Eagleburger (then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), as well as many other American officials, were determined to do everything to prove that Romania was independent minded and deserved every bit of American support. When Funderburk insisted that human rights were being flagrantly violated by Ceausescu's regime, Eagleburger sent him an indignant cable "for his eyes only," warning the ambassador to back off from human rights/emigration concerns.

Funderburk met Ceausescu on various occasions and wrote one of the best profiles of this dictatorial leader. He describes him as shrewd, intelligent, ruthless, and merciless. Seventy years old and sick, he is now frantically engaged in eradicating the entire Romanian cultural heritage, destroying churches in Bucharest as if God almighty his principal enemy. He has erased much of the ancient downtown area of the Romanian capital to build a grotesque civic center and plaza large enough to accommodate a million people who are supposed to come to adulate and applaud him.

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Behind the veil of nationalism and independence from Moscow, nevertheless, "Ceausescu and his gang, masters of disinformation and conspiracy," to use the author's own words, have cheated the West and reduced the Romanian people to statistical anonymity. Writes Funderburk, "The lack of freedom, human dignity, and basic rights are reflected in a beaten spirit, sense of depression, and loss of hope." While Communist Romania secretly transferred American technology to the Soviet Union, violating every contract, numerous American representatives would ceaselessly praise Ceausescu's courage and independent foreign policy. "Little was ever said publicly," writes the former ambassador, "to criticize Ceausescu for his evil policies, because this was not the diplomatic way to deal with sensitive 'friends'."

Caught between the entrenched bureaucracy of the State, the sinister regime of Ceausescu, and the untold suffering of the Romanians, David Funderburk resigned his appointment in 1985. He later testified about his experience, and eventually he came out with this book; a contribution to everyone who wants to understand US policy toward Romania, toward Eastern Europe, and toward communism. Whether his attitude and this book will influence US foreign policy is a matter for speculation but it would be useful to conclude this review with Funderburk's own closing paragraph:

> One day the complete story of misery, gulags, and death under Communism will come out. Americans will hold the State Department élite accountable for perpetuating a misconceived policy that is a threat to the United States and no help for the captive peoples. And the danger of Communist slavery and Soviet expansionism will be laid bare for all to see. Until that day it is our duty to weaken and break the "convergence of interests" link between the State Department leadership and Eastern European Communist regimes like Romania.

Nicholas Dima

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THE TRAGEDY OF TIBET

By Eva M. Neterowicz

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Chapter 5: Tibet Faces Present Challenges

This monograph presents an account of the events leading to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, which quickly swamped the brave resistance of the small and outdated Tibetan army, but met with no resistance from the international community, despite Tibetan appeals for help to various powers, including India, Britain and the United Nations.

It explains the Chinese control over the Panchen Lama, and the initial efforts of the Dalai Lama to mitigate the evils of Chinese occupation.

It explains how the inability of the Dalai Lama to protect the Tibetan peoples and culture from the far-reaching plans of the occupiers led to the Dalai Lama's final decision to flee the country on foot, escaping through the forests and mountain ranges to India, escorted only by a small detachment of loyal Tibetan guards and his closest advisors.

The extent of Chinese acts of oppression is described, and evidence is introduced to support the charges that Peking plans to use Tibet as an area for colonial resettlement of the excess Chinese mainland population. The various revolts of the Tibetan peoples are listed, and eyewitness accounts given by Western visitors of the savage reaction by Chinese troops and police are cited. Historic monasteries containing priceless antique treasures were shelled by the Chinese miliary, and Tibet's unique cultural history was particularly targeted for destruction during the so-called Cultural Revolution.

The author notes the attempts made by Peking since the cultural revolution to rebuild some monasteries, but to replace the existing Buddhist monks by a new breed of monks preaching a form of communism under the guise of Buddhism. The continued attempts of the monks and the peoples to retain their sense of Tibetan identity and culture are traced up to January 1989, and the unrelenting and vicious suppression of all and every public demonstration by the occupying military is recorded.

The text is accompanied by a useful map of Greater Tibet, showing the invasion route taken by the Chinese army, and areas of Tibet which have been expropriated into other provinces of the People's Republic of China as well as the relatively small area which is today regard as the 'province' of Tibet. As an appendix, the Monograph includes two informative resolutions of the U.S. Congress, documenting the misdeeds of the PRC military and government, and calling freedom and self-determination for the Tibetan people.

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